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Determined that both his shipmates and he resist the call of the Sirens,
Ulysses employs two devices. He instructs his men to put wax in their ears and to
tie him to the mast so that he can experience the temptation yet resist it.1
Sometimes, though, it is not possible either to eliminate a temptation or to make it
impossible to act on it. The modern literature on commitment highlights less
constraining mechanisms that make a certain course of action less feasible or
attractive without ruling it out altogether. A principal strategy is to enter into an
arrangement in which one will suffer costs if one yields to temptation.2 For
example, G. Terence Wilson describes weight-reduction programs in which
“failure to meet predetermined goals may result in the client forfeiting a sum of
money to his or her most disliked organization or political group.”3
This Article describes what we call a “compensating commitment bond,”
which is a variation on this type of commitment mechanism. 4 An individual or
entity that wishes to commit itself using a conventional forfeiture promise faces
the following trade-off: Placing funds at risk increases the chance that the party
will achieve some goal; there is a chance of failure, however, and the expected
costs of this failure must be balanced against the benefit of the increased
1

HOMER, THE ODYSSEY bk. XII
JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND
CONSTRAINTS 68-69 (2000).
3
G. Terence Wilson, Behavior Therapy and the Treatment of Obesity, in THE ADDICTIVE
BEHAVIORS 207, 218 (W.R. Miller ed., 1980). This approach and some similar commitment
strategies are implemented in a website of which one of us is a cofounder. See
http://www.stickk.com/faq.php#charities (last visited July 10, 2009) (noting that one can arrange
to forfeit money either to a charity or to an “anti-charity”). That site, however, does not use or
discuss the commitment bonds approach described here or provide any similar means for
participants to receive an upfront benefit for agreeing to pay a cost if they should fail to reach their
goals. Jon Elster describes this approach and one in which one receives a benefit for reaching a
goal, but the benefit is received from money that a committing individual pays in advance, so the
only difference from the costs scenario is whether the payment is made up front. ELSTER, supra
note 2, at 70.
4
We use the word “commitment” in place of what the literature often refers to as “precommitment.” Jon Elster notes the terminological confusion: “In Ulysses and the Sirens I referred
to this phenomenon as ‘precommitment’ or ‘self-binding.’ Others have used the terms
‘commitment’ or ‘self-commitment.’” ELSTER, supra note 2, at 4. We use the term “commitment”
to be as inclusive as possible. The word “precommitment” seems redundant, because all
commitments by definition are promises concerning the future.
At times, we will refer to “compensating commitment bonds” simply as “commitment
bonds,” in part because the concept of a bond already often denotes a financial instrument where
the writer of the bond receives compensation. Distinguishing between compensating and noncompensating commitments is useful because some have used the “commitment bond” term to
refer to non-compensating commitments. See, e.g., Tim Harford, You Bet! My Commitment Bond
Adventure, http://blogs.ft.com/undercover/2007/11/you-bet-my-comm.html/ (Nov. 13, 2007).
2
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likelihood of success. The cost of some desired degree of commitment thus might
not be worth the benefit. In contrast, a compensating commitment bond provides
the party entering into the commitment some benefit (either definite or
contingent) for entering into that commitment, thus offsetting the risk of
forfeiture. That is, instead of simply promising to forfeit money to a charity in the
event of a failed commitment, the committing party sells the right to receive any
forfeited funds to a third party. The commitment is a fair bet rather than a oneway ratchet.
This Article develops the concept of compensating commitment bonds for
their potential use in a range of legal applications. For initial illustrative purposes,
however, consider someone who aims to lose thirty pounds in a year. Suppose
that there is a 10% chance that the person can reach this goal without any form of
commitment, but the probability will increase to 40% if the individual has
$10,000 at stake. With a conventional commitment, the person must decide
whether a 30% increase in the probability of reaching the goal is worth putting
$10,000 at risk. With a commitment bond, however, the person can sell to a third
party the right to receive the $10,000 in the event of failure. Assuming symmetric
information, a third party should be willing to pay almost $6,000 for the 60%
chance of receiving $10,000.
If the third party did pay $6,000, then the expected value to a risk neutral
committing party would be zero, because the committing party would receive ex
ante an amount equal to the expected cost of the forfeiture. In fact, the third party
payment is likely to be less than $6,000, given that the third party is accepting the
risk of any expected enforcement costs. Additionally, assuming that the
committing party is somewhat risk-averse, the committing party bears a risk cost.
Nonetheless, entering into the commitment may be considerably more attractive
than it would be without commitment bonds. The cost of the commitment
produced by the commitment bond is the amount that it costs to induce the third
party to bear the risk (causing the payment to fall short of $6,000) plus the risk
cost borne by the committing party. This is likely to be considerably less than the
$10,000 at risk.
Commitment bonds thus make commitment much more affordable,
creating a range of applications that would otherwise be unattractive.
Commitment bonds can help governments make credible policy. For instance, a
government might use commitment bonds as a substitute for a constitutional
balanced budget requirement by promising to compensate bondholders with $1
for every dollar of budget deficit.5 Without the ex ante compensatory payment
from the bondholders, it might be inadvisable for a government to take on this
potential liability. The commitment benefit (assuming that there is a benefit from
5

See infra Part II.C.1.a.
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such a commitment) might not be worth the expected payment. A commitment
bond could be just as effective a deterrent as an uncompensated commitment, but
at lower expected cost. If the government meets its commitment, it comes out
ahead, and this benefit largely offsets the cost of failure, especially for a relatively
risk-neutral entity like a government.
Our purpose is less to assess the strength of the normative case for any
particular compensating commitment than to illustrate several classes of potential
normative justifications for entering into compensating commitments. We will
also consider applications of commitment bonds that illustrate their particular
structural advantages and disadvantages. The balanced budget commitment is an
example of a commitment bond that, like a constitutional provision but less
strongly, seeks to ensure vindication of some high-order principle or preference.
Commitments also might be used to send signals to third parties. For example,
they can be used to assure holders of conventional bonds that inflation will be low
or to facilitate political and legislative compromise.
Another possible legal use of a commitment bond is to enhance an
individual’s or entity’s attractiveness as a contracting party. Indeed, the literature
has already explored this subset of compensating commitment bonds. Robert
Cooter and Ariel Porat explain that “when the promisor and promisee affect the
probability of nonperformance or the magnitude of the resulting loss, efficient
incentives require each of them to bear 100 percent of the resulting harm.” 6 The
promisor, Cooter and Porat suggest, can promise to pay damages to a third party
in the event some condition that is undesirable to the promisee occurs. This way,
both parties have incentives to take care. Cooter and Porat call this “antiinsurance” because the promisor agrees to make a payment to the anti-insurer in
the event of some bad contingency instead of receiving a payment from an insurer
to compensate for such a contingency. 7 In our terminology, an individual may
6

Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Anti-Insurance, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 203, 204 (2002).
One might extend the label “anti-insurance” to cover examples outside a contractual relationship.
In some of our examples, including a simple weight loss contract, the label would make sense. The
insured is receiving money instead of paying money, and then in the event of the bad contingency
must pay money rather than receiving money. But there are other examples, even within the frame
of contractual relationships considered by Cooter and Porat, in which the label makes less sense.
For example, Cooter and Porat discuss the possibility of “anti-insurance for gains.” Id. at 218-21.
“When the promisor and promisee affect the probability or magnitude of a gain,” they argue,
“efficient incentives require each of them to bear 100 percent of the resulting gain.” Id. at 218. A
lawyer and client who is a plaintiff in a litigation might pay a third party in exchange for the third
party’s agreement to match the eventual recovery, so that the lawyer and client each receive 100%
of the damages and thus each has optimal effort incentives. Here, the arrangement also differs
from a standard insurance contract but in a different way; the insured makes an up-front payment
for a right to receive money in the event of a good contingency. We prefer the label “commitment
bonds” because it has applicability beyond contexts that seem related to insurance, and because
the word “bond” emphasizes the purpose of the arrangement: that an individual or entity is seeking
7
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usefully enter into a commitment bond as a contractual concession to another
party. What Cooter and Porat do not consider is that commitment bonds may be
useful outside of being a substitute for contractual provisions like warranties that
would have undesirable incentive effects.8 Cooter and Porat’s focus on contracts
leads them to overlook the possibility that a single party wanting to commit could
beneficially sell a compensating commitment bond.9 They thus also do not
recognize the possibility that government could use commitment bonds to achieve
self-restraint.
This Article introduces and develops the concept and potential uses of
commitment bonds. Part I.A describes single entity commitment bonds and
explains the role of commitment bonds in signaling resolve while showing how
the sale of such bonds may compensate the committing party for potential
forfeitures arising out of the commitment. Part I.B then describes a family of
incentive-equivalent bonds that vary the timing and contingency of cash flows
and explains how auctioning commitment bonds creates the opportunity for the
bonding process to aid in the process of goal setting itself.
Part II considers single entity commitment bonds in the governmental
context. Part II.A discusses whether the government can enter into commitment
bonds as a legal matter, and Part II.B considers other challenges to commitment
by the government, such as whether those commitments would be credible. Part
II.C continues by discussing the functions of governmental commitment and
examining specific examples where government commitment bonds may be
useful.
Part III considers mutual commitment bonds, in which two or more parties
individually agree to enter into a commitment bond with an external party. Mutual
commitment bonds differ from single party bonds because each party is motivated
to commit because it wants another party to constrain itself. Part III.A develops
reasons for mutual commitment bonds, and Part III.B explores potential legal

to bind itself. Cooter and Porat’s focus on contractual contexts disguises the fact that the central
aspect of an anti-insurance contract is that an individual or entity seeks or agrees to constrain
itself. Our label reinforces that bonds are a mechanism by which a party can do so.
8
The first sentence of Cooter and Porat’s paper reveals the contractual frame and motivation of
their analysis: “Promises pose a dilemma for incentives.” Id. at 203. When Cooter and Porat
compare anti-insurance to other legal devices, the comparison is to other tools of contract law. Id.
at 223-25. Some of their conclusions are specific to the contractual context and might be different
for other commitment bonds. For example, they argue, “Anti-insurance contracts are especially
appropriate for one-shot transactions rather than for repeated interactions.” Id. at 215.
9
Even Cooter and Porat’s formal model involves two contracting parties. They note, “At time 0,
the anti-insurer gives (pa, pb) to A and B, respectively, where pa and pb are positive for antiinsurance for losses and negative for anti-insurance for gains.” Id. at 230. They thus ignore the
possibility in which pa or pb equals zero.
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applications for mutual commitment bonds among private parties and among
governments.
I.

SINGLE ENTITY COMMITMENT BONDS

Far and away the most important aspect of compensating commitment
bonds is the idea that the prospect of compensation for expected forfeitures
radically reduces the cost of committing without reducing the incentive to follow
through on the commitment. People have been using commitment devices for
centuries to increase their own resolve or to credibly signal that resolve to others.
The ability to achieve this while simultaneously being compensated for the
expected forfeitures should by itself expand the demand for such devices. In this
Part, we will describe a family of incentive-equivalent commitment bond
implementations that vary the timing and contingency of the cash flows. We will
focus on three implementations (which we call the ex ante, ex post, and wager
implementations) that have particular salience. We will also describe the
behavioral and structural factors that tend to make particular implementations
more effective.
We will also show that auctioning commitment bonds creates the
opportunity for the bonding process to aid in the process of goal setting itself.
Commitment bond auctions are a kind of market mechanism that generates thirdparty assessments of the likelihood of commitment success. But instead of
choosing the goal and the stakes and letting the subsequent auction reveal the
probability of success, it is possible for the committing party to choose the goal
and the desired probability of success. Then the committing party would let the
market determine the minimum stakes that are required. Or, for goals that are
susceptible to continuous variation (such as weight-loss or budget deficits or
energy conservation), it is possible to choose the stakes and the desired
probability of success and let the market choose the maximally obtainable goal.
Commitment bond auctions can allow the market to signal to the committing
party how best to set the stakes or even the commitment goal.
A. Compensating Commitments
1. A Family of Incentive-Equivalent Approaches
In our earlier example, we imagined a weight-loss commitment bond
where the committing party put $10,000 at risk if the party did not weigh thirty
pounds less at the end of one year. Assuming that $10,000 stakes created a 40%
chance of success and abstracting away from real-world transaction and
enforcement costs as well as the time-value of money, potential counterparties
should be willing to pay close to $6,000 to purchase the potential $10,000
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forfeiture. The upfront payment of $6,000 is the expected forfeiture (60% x
$10,000), and the exchange of the unconditional ex ante payment for the
conditional ex post forfeiture makes the commitment bond a fair bet to both sides.
We call this version of a commitment bond the ex ante implementation.
But commitment bonds can be structured in other ways. For example, the
committing party could put $10,000 at risk (promising to pay a counterparty this
amount upon failing to keep the commitment), and counterparties would make
offers of an amount that must be paid to the committing party ex post if the
committing party succeeds in keeping the commitment. We call this version of a
commitment bond the ex post implementation, because the committing party
receives only the possibility of ex post compensation without any ex ante
compensation. Because the counterparty must pay only if the committing party
succeeds, the offers will generally be higher. For example, if the probability of
success remained at 40%, counterparties should be willing to offer a contingent
payment of $15,000 for success in exchange for the right to receive $10,000 for
commitment failure (40% x $15,000 = 60% x $10,000).
Below, we will focus on the behavioral impact of alternative commitment
frames, but in the neoclassical model, the foregoing example produces a $25,000
incentive for the committing party to keep her commitment. The committing party
earns $15,000 if she succeeds and loses $10,000 if she fails, for a combined
difference of $25,000. This larger incentive might well increase the probability of
success and hence reduce the amount that counterparties would be willing to offer
to below $15,000. It is possible, however, to derive an incentive-equivalent ex
post implementation. If the committing party reduced her potential forfeiture to
just $4,000, counterparties would be willing to offer $6,000 in ex post
compensation. A counterparty should expect this amount of contingent
compensation to produce a 40% of success, because the committing party, as with
the ex ante implementation example, would have a total incentive of $10,000 (the
$6,000 carrot plus the $4,000 stick). This ex post implementation would be a fair
bet because a contingent payment of $6,000 would have the same expected value
(40% x $6,000) as the contingent forfeiture of $4,000 (60% x $4,000).
A surprising result (which we prove in a footnote10) is that for incentiveequivalent implementations, the incentive-equivalent ex ante and ex post
10

Let:

EPF = ex post forfeiture if commitment failure
EPC = ex post compensation, if commitment success
I = EPC – EPF, equals total commitment incentive
P = probability of success given level of incentive stakes
EAC = ex ante compensation that bidder would be willing to bid if EPC = 0 and for
chance to receive EPF.
B = bid for right to S in event of failure (1 – P), where entire bid is paid ex ante
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compensations will be equal. In the above examples, counterparties will either
pay $6,000 ex ante for a potential forfeiture of $10,000, or offer $6,000 ex post
for a potential forfeiture of $4,000. For constant forfeiture amounts, the ex post
compensation will always be greater than the ex ante compensation, because the
ex post compensation needs to be paid only if the commitment is a success. But to
maintain a constant commitment incentive, the forfeiture amount can be
substantially lower with ex post compensation. It turns out the lower forfeiture
amount exactly offsets the high ex post compensation effect. So, abstracting away
from behavioral biases such as loss aversion, one would expect in the neoclassical model that the present value of compensation would be the same for both
the ex ante and ex post implementation.
A problem with both these ex ante and ex post implementations is that
third party bond holders may have difficulty collecting the forfeitures if the
committing parties fail to keep their commitment. So far, we have varied the
timing of the payment to the committing party, but we can also vary the timing of
the payment from the committing party. A simple approach forces the committing
party to pay an upfront deposit of any required forfeiture amount – the deposit
being returned in full if the commitment is kept. Thus, instead of receiving $6,000
in ex ante compensation in exchange for putting at risk $10,000 to be paid in the
future, one could imagine being required to put $10,000 down as an ex ante
deposit to make sure that the $10,000 forfeiture can actually be paid. On net, the
committing party would pay $4,000 ex ante (placing a $10,000 deposit but
receiving ex ante compensation of $6,000) and would receive the $10,000 deposit
back if she succeeds (and nothing back if she fails). We call this version the
wager implementation, because the timing of the cash flows closely resembles
those of traditional bookie wagers. This approach is also incentive-equivalent: the

BC = bid for right to S in event of failure (1 – P), where bid is contingent and only paid in
event of success, and
I = total incentive.
Using these it possible to derive that in a competitive equilibrium, the ex ante (unconditional) bid:
B = S * (1-P). And since in the ex ante implementation I = S, we can restate the ex ante bid
amount as
B = I * (1 – P).
(1)
In contrast, the ex post (conditional) bid amount in equilibrium should be such that the bidder’s
probable cost of compensation equals the probable benefit of forfeiture: BC * P = S * (1 – P). For
the ex post implementation we also know that the total commitment incentive will equal: I = BC +
S, so S = I – BC. By substitution and manipulation, we have
BC * P = (I – BC) * (1 – P)
BC * P = I – BC – IP + BC*P
BC = I – IP = I * (1 – P),
(2)
which is equal to (1).
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only difference from the ex ante approach is the deposit ensuring that the
committing party will be able to meet its obligations.
Table 1 summarizes the cash flows from these three implementations. All
three are incentive-equivalent, because in each case the difference between the ex
post compensation (which is contingent on success) and the ex post forfeiture
(which is contingent on failure) is a constant $10,000. Moreover, each of these
three implementations holds one of the three cash flows to zero: (1) the ex ante
implementation has no ex post compensation and from an ex post perspective is
purely a stick incentive; (2) the wager (or ex ante deposit) implementation has no
ex post forfeiture and from an ex post perspective is purely a carrot incentive; and
(3) the ex post implementation has no ex ante compensation and from an ex post
perspective is a mixture of carrots and sticks.
Table 1: An Example of the Family of Incentive-Equivalent Implementations
Ex ante
Ex post
Ex post
Implementation
compensation
compensation
forfeiture
6,000
0
-10,000
Ex Ante
0
6,000
-4,000
Ex Post
-4,000
10,000
0
Wager
6,000 – K
K
K – 10,000
General
The final row of Table 1 shows that these three implementations are
special cases in a larger class of incentive-equivalent commitment bond
implementations, all of which merely subtract some constant (K) from the ex ante
compensation and add the same amount to both of the ex post cash flows. This
generalization allows us not only to see the underlying links between the three
core implementations, but also to generate additional incentive equivalent
implementations where all three cash flows are non-zero. For example, setting K
equal to $3,000 constructs a scenario where counterparties pay $3,000 in ex ante
compensation to receive the chance to win $7,000 in ex post forfeiture but take on
the obligation to pay an additional $3,000 in ex post compensation if the
committing party succeeds. As we’ll soon argue, this larger family of incentiveequivalent implementations is more than a theoretical curiosity. In a world with
liquidity constraints and cognitive biases, it gives policy makers a richer toolbox
of instruments from which to choose.
The above examples hold the incentive constant at $10,000 and assumes
that this incentive, regardless of whether it is implemented through carrots or
sticks, produces a constant probability of success of 40%. More generally within
the neoclassical model, we could define the total commitment incentive, I, to be:
I = EPC – EPF
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where EPC is the ex post compensation (which is contingent on success) and EPF
is the ex post forfeiture (which is contingent on failure). Then if we let P(I) be the
probability of commitment success given a commitment incentive, then the
expected forfeiture from the ex ante implementation, EF, for any particular I will
be:
EF = (1 – P(I))*I.
With these definitions, Table 2 reports a more general statement of the
family of incentive-equivalent commitments. For example, if a $20,000 incentive
produced a 75% probability of success, then I = $20,000 and EF = $5,000. So we
could expect a counterparty to pay close to $5,000 in ex ante compensation for the
chance to receive a $20,000 forfeiture. Alternatively, counterparties would offer
up to $5,000 in ex post compensation for the chance to receive a $15,000
forfeiture. Or, the committing party would put down $15,000 ex ante and receive
$20,000 from counterparties in the event of success. All of the implementations,
including the more general K-constant implementations, are fair bets, because the
expected compensation from the counterparty equals the expected forfeiture to the
counterparty.11
Table 2: A General Description of Outcomes for a Family of IncentiveEquivalent Implementations
Ex ante
Ex post
Ex post
Implementations
compensation
compensation
forfeiture
EF
0
-I
Ex Ante
0
EF
EF – I
Ex Post
EF - I
I
0
Wager
EF – K
K
K–I
General
2. A Behavioral Comparison
While the family of implementations described in Table 2 is somewhat
redundant in a stylized world without transaction or enforcement costs or
cognitive biases, different implementations can produce different results when we
move away from these assumptions. For example, as mentioned above, difficulty
in enforcing ex post forfeitures will drive the parties toward the wager
implementation. Conversely, the ex ante implementation will be favored in
11

From the general, K-constant, implementation we can see that the expected a bidder’s expected
payments and receipts would be: EF – K + PK + (1 – P)(K – I) = 0.
Substituting EF = (1 – P)I, we have
(1 – P)I – K + PK + K – PK – (1 – P)I = 0,
where the left-side simplifies to 0, indicating that the cash flows are a fair bet.
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circumstances where the committing party is concerned that the counterparty will
not pay the ex post compensation if there is commitment success. The ex post
implementation (as one in a range of constant-K implementations) splits the
difference – placing some risk of enforcement on both the counterparty and the
committing party.
Alternatively, if the question is not one of enforcement but of liquidity,
then we can again see nonequivalence among the implementations. In the
foregoing example, where a $10,000 incentive produced a 40% chance of success,
if the committing party has only $5,000, then the ex ante implementation (with its
potential $10,000 forfeiture) would be infeasible, whereas the ex post
implementation (with its $4,000 forfeiture) or the wage implementation (with its
$4,000 ex ante deposit) would be feasible. 12 Or, if the counterparties are liquidity
constrained, then the wager implementation (which in the foregoing example
requires a potential $10,000 ex post compensation) is less feasible than the ex ante
or ex post implementations (which require only $6,000 payments) to support the
same incentive amount.
The picture becomes even more interesting if committing parties exhibit
cognitive deviations from traditional expected utility theory. For example, if the
committing party exhibits loss aversion,13 then committing parties will work
harder to avoid failure when incentives are framed as contingent punishments
(sticks) than as contingent rewards (carrots). Returning to the numeric example in
Table 1 (and assuming for now that counterparties do not adjust their offers in
anticipation of cognitive effects), it is easy to rank the three core implementations
in terms of predicted incentive effects if we ignore the sunk ex ante compensation
or payments and focus solely on the ex post contingent cash flows. From this ex
post perspective, the ex ante implementation will produce the greatest incentive
effect because it uses the largest stick of $10,000. The ex post compensation
produces the second largest incentive because it combines a $6,000 carrot with a
$4,000 stick. The wager implementation produces the smallest loss aversion and
thus the smallest incentive because it relies solely on a $10,000 carrot to induce
compliance.
However, our earlier emphasis that the wager implementation is identical
to the ex ante compensation implementation coupled with a $10,000 deposit is a
clue that the ex ante lump sum payments may play a crucial role in whether the ex
post cash flows are treated as gains or losses. Suppose that the committing party

12

Indeed any constant K implementation for $5,000 < K < $11,000 would be feasible given the
$5,000 liquidity constraint.
13
See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A
Reference-Dependent Model, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1039 (1991) (exploring the evidence for and
consequences of losses having greater impact than gains).
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treats gains and losses equivalently, but suffers from a sunk cost fallacy. 14 A
committing party who starts off paying $4,000 under the wager implementation
may work harder to avoid losing this money for good. Meanwhile, just as
gamblers who get ahead in their initial bets show a great willingness to play with
“house money,” committing parties who start off with a $6,000 payment may treat
the prospect of forfeiting $10,000 as really just a $4,000 net loss. Thus, if we
imagine that parties count sunk costs (and do not deduct them from possible
gains) and ignore already received benefits (deducting them from possible losses),
then the wager implementation produces the largest incentive effect, and the ex
ante version produces the smallest.
The loss aversion dominance of the wager implementation over the ex
ante implementation on these assumptions should impact the amount that
counterparties are willing to offer to the extent that counterparties believe that
committing parties “suffer” from loss aversion. For example, if the presence of
the initial $6,000 payment makes the ex ante implementation feel like only a
$4,000 incentive, counterparties might expect a lower probability of success.
They would then be willing to offer even more than $6,000 for the chance to earn
$10,000. Under this reasoning, a $7,000 or $8,000 initial payment would further
undermine the perceived incentive effect. But rather than complete unraveling, in
equilibrium we would ordinarily expect inflated payments that still allowed for
some probability of success. While it is tempting to think of these higher ex ante
bids as a good thing, they are driven by a market assessment that the commitment
device would have a lower probability of being effective.
Another relevant behavioral possibility is that hyperbolic discounting
might lead committing parties to have time-inconsistent preferences.15 (For
simplicity, we have so far ignored standard discounting, though it would be
straightforward to adjust the payments for the time value of money.) Hyperbolic
discounting causes people to exhibit “present bias” because they sharply discount
any cash flows that are received in the future, regardless of how far in the future
they are received. For example, behavioral economists Ted O’Donoghue and Matt
Rabin make an extreme, but simplifying, assumption that hyperbolic discounters
cut the value of any future reward in half – whether it is 1 or 100 weeks in the
future.16 Under this assumption, a committing party who is a hyperbolic

14

See generally Thomas Kelly, Sunk Costs, Rationality, and Acting for the Sake of the Past, 38
NOÛS 60 (2004) (exploring the sunk cost fallacy and arguing that honoring sunk costs is
sometimes rational).
15
See, e.g., Fernando S. Machado & Rajiv K. Sinha, Smoking Cessation: A Model of Planned vs.
Actual Behavior for Time-Inconsistent Consumers, 26 MKTG. SCI. 834 (2007) (exploring the
implications of hyperbolic discounting and time inconsistency among smokers).
16
Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Optimal Sin Taxes, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 1825 (2006).
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discounter would experience the three core implementations described in Table 1
as if they produced the following cash flows:
Table 3. Possible effects of hyperbolic discounting
Ex ante
Ex post
Implementation
compensation
compensation
$6,000
0
Ex Ante
0
$3,000
Ex Post
-$4,000
$5,000
Wager
$6,000
–
K
K/2
General

Ex post forfeiture
-$5,000
-$2,000
0
K/2 - $5,000

This table shows that hyperbolic discounting is likely to push toward
favoring the ex ante implementation. A hyperbolic discounter “feels” the full
benefit of a $6,000 compensation for what, from the ex ante perspective, feels like
putting $5,000 at risk. In contrast, the ex post implementation equally discounts
the carrot and the stick, producing less attractive implicit odds, while the
experience of odds of the wager are worst because the hyperbolic discounter is
forced to deposit $4,000 ex ante for the chance to receive what “feels” like a
chance at $5,000.
Indeed, the ex ante implementation flips one of the core results of the
hyperbolic discounting literature. Writers have suggested that the most severe
barrier to entering into commitments is that hyperbolic discounters must be
sophisticated enough to know that they have a problem. 17 For example, a naïve
hyperbolic discounter who puts off an unpleasant task (a cost) today, but
nonetheless believes that she will not put it off in the future, may not feel like she
needs help strengthening resolve. She believes (incorrectly) that she will stop
procrastinating all by herself. Under this theory, naïve hyperbolic discounters are
unlikely to demand commitments to increase their resolve: They procrastinate
now, but they do not think they will have a problem with procrastination in the
future.
But ex ante implementations flip the impact of naïveté. Because the naïf
does not think that she will have a weakness of will in the second period, she will
overestimate the objective probability of success. For a naïve hyperbolic
discounter, the market’s proffered ex ante payment will seem overly generous,
both because it is an immediate payment and because it is in return for what a
naïve hyperbolic discounter will think is a very low probability of forfeiture.
However, the prospect of this future forfeiture will nonetheless have an impact in
17

See, e.g., Jonathan Gruber & Botond Köszegi, Is Addiction “Rational”? Theory and Evidence,
116 Q.J. ECON. 1261, 1279 (2001) (labeling a subset of hyperbolic discounters as “naïve” because
“they do not understand that they cannot make consistent plans through time”).
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raising success rates as the time horizon shrinks and the committing party comes
closer to the time of potential forfeiture, when the potential loss is no longer
discounted. What initially felt like just a potential $5,000 loss will blossom into a
potential $10,000 forfeiture as time elapses and the future becomes the present.
The naïve hyperbolic discounter will consider the proffered compensation
from an ex ante implementation to be better than a fair bet. In essence, as long as
the counterparties offering compensation are more sophisticated than the
committing party in their knowledge of the committing party’s likely continuing
willpower problem, the proceeds of the commitment bond will seem beneficent.
The counterparties’ heightened sophistication can substitute for the committing
party’s lack of sophistication. O’Donoghue and Rabin argue that most humans
“exhibit a tendency to pursue immediate gratification in a way that they
themselves disapprove of in the long run.”18 But ex ante implementations harness
this urge to pursue immediate gratification to encourage participation in taking on
longer term commitment risks.
B. Commitment Auctions
One way to effectuate compensating commitment bonds would be to use
an auction. Specifically, counterparties would serve as bidders, and the highest
bidder would win the right to receive any future forfeit of the committing party.
As we will discuss, such an auction mechanism (in all three implementations)
both has informational benefits and creates the opportunity for the bonding
process to aid in the process of goal setting itself.
1. Informational Benefits
Aside from providing a means for committing parties to solicit offers of
compensation from counterparties, auctions provide an independent benefit in
potentially providing the committing parties with information that can make them
more sophisticated. All of the implementations – including the auctions that
would pay ex post compensation – have ex ante determinations of contractual
terms from which the implicit probability of success can be determined. For
example, imagine an ex post compensation auction where the high bidder offers
to pay $70 contingent on commitment success in exchange for a chance to earn
$100 if the commitment fails. From this winning bid, we can infer that the market
measures the probability of success to be 58.8%.19
18

O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 16, at 1828.
58.8% = 1 – (70/170). More generally, the implicit probability from any of the incentiveequivalent implementations will be 1 – ((EAC + PV(EPC))/(PV(EPC-EPF))), where EAC, EPC
and EPF are defined as before, see supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., and PV() is the
19
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The ability to back out implicit success probabilities ranging from 0% to
100% also underscores a key design choice in setting the size of forfeiture
amounts. In the terms of Calabresi and Melamed,20 commitment bonds can be
structured as either liability or property rules. Property rule commitments would
have more severe forfeitures that would produce implicit success probabilities
closer to 100%. The purpose of property rule commitments would be to deter
future failure by taking choice off the table. Liability rule commitments, in
contrast, would seek to guide future choice by forcing the committing party’s
future self to internalize external impacts of failing to keep a commitment. With
liability rule commitments, the implicit success could be substantially lower,
albeit still higher than it would be in the absence of the forfeiture incentive.
While theory suggests that the implicit probability of success should
generally increase as the amount at risk to be forfeited increases, the amount of
expected compensation can either increase or decrease as the amount at risk to be
forfeited increases. This relationship depends on the elasticity of the probability of
forfeiture with regard to size of the stakes. If the probability of forfeiture is
inelastic with respect to changes in stakes, then increases in the forfeiture amount
will tend to increase the offered ex ante compensation.21 Counterparty bidders will
present value at time of auction of future cash flows.
20
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability;
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); see also IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW:
THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS (2005);
21
In an ex ante compensation auction, the ex ante compensation from a commitment as a function
of the ex post forfeiture is:
EAC(EPF) = P(EPF)*EPF,
Where EAC() = ex ante compensation,
EPF = ex post forfeiture at risk, and
P(EPF) = probability of forfeiture of stakes give EPF.
Using the trusty tools of introductory economics, we can minimize the expected Forfeiture by
finding the stakes that make:
dEAC/dEPF = P(EPF) + (dP/dEPF)*EPF = 0
(1)
which can be restated as:
P/EPF = -dP/dEPF.
(2)
If we assume that people will work harder to keep their commitment when the stakes are
increased, then dP/dS is likely to be less than zero. Equation (2) implies that the ex ante
compensation on a commitment contract will be minimized when:
-(dP/dEPF)/(P/EPF) = e = 1
where e is the elasticity of the probability of forfeiture with respect to the stakes. As long as the
probability of forfeiture is elastic, the ex ante compensation will decrease with increases in the size
of the forfeiture amount. Or to put it slightly more simply, so long as the percentage reduction in P
is greater than the percentage increase in EPF, ex ante compensation will increase with reduction
in stakes. For sufficiently high stakes if the probability of forfeiture remains greater than 0, there
are good reasons to assume that the responsiveness of the probability will become inelastic, so that
the ex ante compensation will begin to increase with the forfeiture amount.
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pay more for a greater potential forfeit reward. But if the probability of forfeiture
is sufficiently elastic with respect to an increase in the stakes, then increasing the
forfeiture amount will decrease the ex ante compensation. The reduced
probability of a forfeiture in this case more than compensates for its increased
size.22
A committing party who naively overestimates the probability of success
would need to confront bidders’ skepticism (evidenced by bidders’ willingness to
offer large ex ante compensation). Market feedback indicating that willpower
problems may extend into the future might itself improve the committing party’s
sophistication. This ex ante information might help committing parties change
their behavior. A committing party who learns that the implicit probability of
success is too low might react by raising the stakes to increase the probability of
success.
2. Goal Setting Auctions
Instead of backing out an implicit probability of success for a prespecified goal, it is possible to structure commitment auctions over goal-setting
itself in order to achieve pre-specified probabilities of success. For example, with
regard to weight loss, it is well established in the literature that dieters have a
tendency to set unrealistically large weight loss goals. 23 In our earlier
implementations, the auction contract specified the goal (for example, the number
of pounds the party intends to lose by some date) and two of three cashflows (ex
ante compensation, ex post compensation, or ex post forfeiture). The auction
would then be conducted on the unspecified cashflow to find the bidder that was
willing to offer the most advantageous term on this dimension.
In contrast, under a goal-setting auction, the committing party would set
all three cashflows and would then allow bidders to compete on who would offer
the most easily achieved goal. Pre-specifying the three cashflows would mean
implicitly specifying the required probability of success. The auction bids would
then determine the goal that would produce that requisite probability. For
example, imagine that a 250-pound Rush specified $1,000,000 as an ex post
forfeiture, $0 as ex post compensation, and $400,000 as ex ante compensation in a
22

In ongoing commitments with the possibility of multiple forfeitures or forfeitures of different
amounts, it will not be possible to back out a single probability of success.
23
Most obese people want to lose a lot more than a realistic 10% of their body weight. A 1997
study of obese dieters found that most wanted to lose more than 30% of their initial weight. Gary
D. Foster et al., What Is a Reasonable Weight Loss? Patients’ Expectations and Evaluations of
Obesity Treatment Outcomes, 65 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 79 (1997). The National
Institute of Health recommends an initial goal of no more than 10%. NIH, Guidelines on
Overweight
and
Obesity:
Electronic
Textbook,
http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/guidelines/obesity/e_txtbk/txgd/4311.htm.
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commitment contract for him to lose X pounds by the end of the year. The prespecified cash flows would be a fair bet if Rush had a 60% of losing X pounds. He
could hold a Dutch auction where bidders competed by offering successively
lower X’s.24 The bidder offering the lowest X, the most easily achieved weightloss goal, would win the auction and be obligated to pay the $400,000 in ex ante
compensation.
As in other contexts, it would be possible for the committing party to
include a “reserve price” for the auction. For example, if it would not be healthy
to lose more than 100 lbs, the initial auction could specify that the initial bids had
to be less than that amount. Not all contexts are equally amenable to goal-setting
auctions. Some commitments by their nature are all-or-nothing affairs. For
example, commitments to quit smoking or to do your taxes on time are not as
divisible as a weight-loss commitment. Even smoking cessation commitments,
however, might be differentiated by number of cigarettes a day or the speed to
cessation.
It is also possible to use auctions to help choose the most effective
forfeiture amount. Instead of specifying the three cash-flows and having the
bidders compete in offering the most advantageous goal to the committing party,
it is possible for the committing party to specify the goal and the desired ratio of
compensation to forfeiture and then have bidders compete on the minimum
forfeiture that will produce the desired probability of success. For example,
imagine that Barack wants to enter into a commitment contract to quit smoking by
the end of the year and wants to have at least a 75% chance of success. He could
auction a commitment to quit smoking where he promises as a contingent
forfeiture to pay four times the amount of any ex ante compensation. The bidders
would then compete by entering successively higher offers of ex ante
compensation. For example, if Barack would have a 75% chance of success with
$1,000,000 at risk, then a competitive auction would produce bids of ex ante
compensation close to $250,000.25
Stepping back, we have shown not only that compensating commitment
bonds radically reduce the price of making credible commitments, but also that
commitment auctions can be implemented in a bewildering array of incentive24

The auction equally could be conducted as a silent auction, with the bidder offering the lowest X
announced as the winner when the bids are revealed. The contract would then be for that value of
X, or alternative for the second-lowest value of X. This would make the auction akin to a Vickrey
second-price auction, which induces bidders to make the most favorable bids that they would be
willing to accept. See William Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed
Tenders, 16 J. FIN. 8 (1971).
25
An analogous commitment auction was proposed to privatize the setting of bail bonds to assure
that defendants had a sufficient probability of showing up for their trial. See Ian Ayres & Joel
Waldfogel, A Market Test for Race Discrimination in Bail Setting, 46 STAN. L. REV. 987 (1994).
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equivalent ways that would allow committing parties to respond to a variety of
cognitive, liquidity and information barriers. The case for compensating
commitment contracts is strengthened by considering things like time-inconsistent
preferences and naïve, self-serving bias. Moreover, the market dimension of these
auctions can be harnessed to help committing parties choose more realistic goals
or more effective stakes.
II. COMMITMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT

Our discussion so far has focused on use of commitment bonds by singleentity private parties. We now consider the government as an example of such an
entity. We begin by considering whether the government may sell compensating
commitment bonds. In the United States, existing law is ambiguous, but there are
strong arguments for enforcing commitment bonds in at least some instances. We
then consider various possible uses of commitment bonds. Although we
sometimes use the U.S. case as an example, these uses could easily be adopted in
other countries as well if compensating commitment bonds are permissible under
their laws. We identify three classes of potential uses of commitment bonds: to
ensure continued commitment to broad principles, to signal third parties to affect
their behavior, and to facilitate political compromise.
A. The Legal Status of Governmental Commitment Bonds
Most of the analysis in this Article is applicable to any country or
government, but here we focus specifically on the United States. We find no clear
answer in the existing legal literature or case law as to whether the federal
government may use compensating commitment bonds; indeed, if there were such
an answer, the originality of this Article might well be called into question.
Nonetheless, we argue that there may well be normatively attractive reasons for
the government to enter into commitments, and that at least when these reasons
are applicable, this should factor into any judicial analysis of commitment bonds.
Assuming that legislatures are generally not allowed to entrench their
decisions and that indirect attempts to entrench may be constitutionally
problematic, we believe that courts might enforce governmental issuance of
commitment bonds, subject to the restriction that the bonds are consistent with
legitimate means and legitimate ends. First, with regard to legitimate means, the
commitment must be sufficiently weak so that there remains a reasonable
probability that the government will fail to meet its commitment. The
commitment bond might legitimately force future government decisionmakers to
internalize the true cost of their decisions in making a future decision, but it
should not take the decision off the table. In the terms of Calabresi and
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Melamed,26 government bonds should implement liability rules and not property
rules. Second, with respect to legitimate ends, government commitment needs to
be motivated primarily as an effort to attain a legitimate goal. This would
preclude the government from using commitment bonds to encourage ends that it
could not insist on directly (for example, because those ends are unconstitutional).
It would also prevent the government from issuing commitment bonds solely to
preserve political victories, absent some sufficiently persuasive neutral reason for
entrenchment.
Proceeding on the assumption that the government at least sometimes can
enter into commitment bonds, we explore some potentially legitimate reasons for
the government to enter into commitment bonds. Some of these reasons for
allowing government commitments—allowing legislators to commit to higherorder principles that it otherwise would not have the fortitude to keep and
signaling third parties about the government’s intentions—are direct parallels of
the motivations for commitment bonds more generally. Another reason,
facilitation of political compromise, is more specific to the legislative process.
1. The Ambiguity of Existing Law
A complete analysis of the permissibility of commitment bonds under U.S.
law is beyond our scope, though we hope to identify the basic arguments on both
sides and to suggest that normative factors might well influence legislative
decisions about whether to enter into commitment bonds and judicial decisions
about whether to enforce them. Commitment bonds may be legal if either (a) the
Congress in general may pass a law that prevents a subsequent Congress from
overturning it by a simple majority vote; (b) Congress cannot do so, but can take
any other action within its enumerated powers that may as a practical matter have
the effect of indirectly constraining future Congresses; or (c) Congress can only
take some actions that may constrain future Congresses, but commitment bonds
are among the actions that it is permissible for Congress to take.
In 2002, Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule argued that one Congress could
entrench a later Congress.27 They suggested a number of reasons that
entrenchment might be normatively beneficial, 28 including that entrenchment may
allow the government to obtain better terms in dealings with third parties 29 and
that commitment enhances legislative predictability. 30 They argue that the
26

See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE
L.J. 1665 (2002).
28
Id. at 1670-73.
29
Id. at 1671.
30
Id. at 1672.
27
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constitutional text does not prevent entrenchment,31 and that history supports its
use.32 John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport counter these arguments,
maintaining that although the Constitution may entrench itself against
amendment, legislation cannot do so.33 Perhaps their most powerful argument is
that it was commonly believed at the Founding that legislators could not entrench
themselves, 34 and that the Antifederalists could have been expected to object if the
Constitution were understood as deviating from this understanding. Stewart Sterk
also counters Posner and Vermeule’s normative arguments, emphasizing that if
legislators have imperfect foresight, the entrenchment tool may do more harm
than good.35
All of these commentators, however, acknowledge that one Congress can
constrain a later Congress to a great extent through its decisions, particularly
through decisions to enter into contracts. For example, Posner and Vermeule
emphasize that “[a] government contract, like an entrenching statute, imposes a
cost—albeit fiscal rather than political—on future legislatures that seek to escape
the consequences of the earlier action.”36 Sterk also notes that it is permissible for
government to enter into contracts, though he notes that this may be justified in
part by the fact that “[b]uilt into contract law is a significant safety valve: the
parties to the contract can always renegotiate.”37 McGinnis and Rappaport,
meanwhile, view government contracts as an exception to the general antientrenchment rule, 38 and they note that “[t]he strongest case for . . . entrenchment
of public contracts is for debt contracts,”39 because they lower the cost of
government borrowing. They note, however, that “debt contracts present a serious
problem” because “government agents will sometimes use this borrowing
authority to shift onto future generations the costs of spending that benefits only
the present generation.”40
McGinnis and Rappaport further note that this exception may be justified
only because “the traditional constitutional rule that emerged during the
nineteenth century . . . strongly presumed that governments cannot contract away
31

Id. at 1674-78.
Id. at 1678-80.
33
See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Symmetric Entrenchment: A Constitutional
Normative Theory, 89 VA. L. REV. 385 (2003).
34
Id. at 390-96.
35
Stewart E. Sterk, Retrenchment on Entrenchment, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 231, 240-44 (2003).
36
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 27, at 1701.
37
Id. at 242-43.
38
McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 33, at 434-36.
39
Id. at 435.
40
Id.
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their sovereign powers.”41 More recent Supreme Court case law, however, treats
the sovereign acts doctrine narrowly. For example, in United States v. Winstar
Corp.,42 the Court rejected a claim that the United States could escape contractual
obligations to financial institutions on account of a legal change. The Court
acknowledged that a “public and general” act of the sovereign could support the
government in seeking discharge of a contractual obligation. 43 In general, “that
defense is traditionally unavailable where the barrier to performance arises from
the act of the party seeking discharge,”44 but this general rule does not apply when
the government acting as sovereign can be distinguished from the government
acting as contractor.45
In Winstar, the government could not escape liability because the statute
was attributed to the government acting as contractor.46 More importantly, for
present purposes, the Court announced a clear “holding,” “that a governmental act
will not be public and general if it has the substantial effect of releasing the
Government from its contractual obligations.”47 Importantly, the Court never even
considers the argument that the contract should be invalidated because it might
constrain a later Congress (such as the one that in fact enacted legislation that led
to large contractual obligations). If the Court were concerned about contracts
unduly entrenching government policy, then it would be logical to say that the
more central the contractual obligations are to a government policy, the stronger
the case that the contract must yield to policy. The Court adopts precisely the
reverse distinction, limiting liability to situations in which the sovereign adopts a
general law that indirectly affects contracting parties.
Admittedly, this does not allow a decisive prediction of how the Court
might treat a compensating commitment bond. Perhaps a case involving a
commitment bond would lead the Court to shift the analysis from a determination
of what capacity the government has acted in to an inquiry into whether contracts
unduly interfere with government policymaking. The strongest argument for
barring commitment bonds—or more plausibly, for finding unconstitutional some
subset of commitment bonds—is that they do not serve the typical functions of
contracts and are expressly intended to contract away a nation’s sovereign
41

McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 33, at 436.
518 U.S. 839 (1996).
43
Id. at 895 (citing Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458 (1925)).
44
Id. at 895.
45
Id. at 895-96.
46
An interesting hypothetical is whether the government could have escaped liability if it
explicitly extinguished its contractual obligations in the new statute. See infra note 60 (discussing
analogous issues for commitment bonds).
47
518 U.S. at 899.
42
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powers, or at least to constrain future governmental action. Whether the Court
would find this problematic presumably depends in part on the normative case for
allowing entrenchment with commitment bonds. We now turn to a brief
normative evaluation, including an analysis of potential limits on commitment
bonds that would alleviate entrenchment concerns.
2. A Normative Evaluation
Government commitment bonds would be most problematic if used to
attempt to accomplish indirectly what the legislature could not constitutionally
compel directly. For example, imagine that a commitment bond provided for a
trillion dollar payment to the bondholders if a woman were ever elected President
of the United States. A legislative provision declaring women ineligible for the
Presidency would be unconstitutional. 48 Yet this commitment bond, while not
foreclosing the possibility altogether, might make it considerably more difficult
for a woman to ascend to the Presidency. An old principle of constitutional
interpretation is that the legislature cannot accomplish indirectly what it is
prohibited from accomplishing directly. 49 This principle is not taken as seriously
today, 50 however, and commentators routinely label the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence on the related unconstitutional conditions doctrine incoherent. 51
Nonetheless, we believe that the Supreme Court would find some basis for
finding such a commitment bond unconstitutional.
The more difficult case is the determination of whether entrenchment
through commitment bonds can be unconstitutional when there is no specific
constitutional concern other than with the entrenchment itself. The case for
unconstitutionality is likely to be strongest when the only purpose behind a
commitment bond is to entrench a current majority over a current minority. For
example, we might imagine that a narrow Republican minority might use
commitment bonds to entrench the Contract with America, or that a narrow
Democratic majority might use commitment bonds to entrench a health care
reform plan. There may not be any obvious textual basis for striking down such a
48

McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 33, at 403.
See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 527 (1856) (“Congress cannot do indirectly what
the Constitution prohibits directly.”).
50
See Frederick Schauer, Too Hard: Unconstitutional Conditions and the Chimera of
Constitutional Consistency, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 989, 994 (1995) (stating that the “rhetoric of ‘the
government cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly’ was poppycock if taken seriously”).
51
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term: Unconstitutional Conditions,
State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 5, 103 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Why
the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism (with Particular Reference to
Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593 (1990).
49
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statute,52 but suspect that the Supreme Court might find some means of striking
down uses of commitment bonds that have no purposes other than to entrench
temporary majorities, for example by holding that the commitment bonds are
inconsistent with the structure of the Constitution.53
Even in these cases, however, defenders of entrenchment may offer an
apolitical reason for entrenchment: that they wish to assure citizens that they can
rely on the continuation of the program. For example, Republicans could defend a
provision of the Contract with America repealing the marriage penalty54 by
arguing that they can better assure citizens that marriage will not reduce their tax
penalty if they can make the change irreversible. And Democrats could entrench a
public option in a health care reform bill by insisting that individuals might be
hesitant to abandon their private insurance plans for a public plan if there were a
chance that the public plan might be abolished and they would no longer have
guaranteed continuing coverage from their private plan. It seems likely that one
could make arguments along these line, some stronger and some weaker, for
virtually any entrenching legislation, whether they are the true motives or not.
Legislators could also simply argue that they believe that the government will
benefit because the commitment bonds will provide revenue that government
officials do not believe they will have to repay. And in many cases, legislators
could claim other apolitical motives for entrenchment, some of which we will
consider below. 55
The courts thus have several options. The first is to prohibit all
governmental issuance of commitment bonds, and the second is to allow all such
use, at least absent constitutional concerns other than entrenchment. The third is
to limit commitment bonds, allowing them in some cases but not in others. There
are several possible approaches that the courts could take in separating
permissible from impermissible commitment bonds.
One approach to limit commitment bonds would be for the courts to try to
determine whether the claimed motive is the true motive. Identifying legislative
52

One possibility is that the courts might hold that some entrenchments violate Article V. See
U.S. CONST. art. V (providing the process for amendment of the Constitution). The argument
might be either that a commitment bond provides effectively unrepealable legislation without the
safeguards of Article V, or that a commitment bond could discourage use of the constitutional
amendment process if a proposed amendment might lead to payout of a bond.
53
Cf. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) (“Because there is no constitutional text
speaking to this precise question, the answer to the [plaintiffs’] challenge must be sought in
historical understanding and practice, in the structure of the Constitution, and in the jurisprudence
of this Court.”).
54
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, CONTRACT WITH AMERICA (1994).
55
See, e.g., Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional
Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95; John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative
Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).
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motive is difficult, however, both because legislators may successfully disguise
it,56 and because the very concept of legislative motive may be a fiction in a multimember body.57 The courts also might try to determine whether the claimed
motives are sufficiently persuasive to justify entrenchment. In the United States,
this would require interpreting existing doctrine counseling against legislative
entrenchment as applicable only where there are insufficiently persuasive
apolitical reasons to allow entrenchment. One might doubt whether the courts can
accomplish such substantive analysis apolitically. 58 On the other hand, the courts
might through common law be able to identify situations in which there are strong
arguments for commitment bonds. The courts could then limit commitment bonds
to these cases.
A second approach in limiting commitment bonds is to permit
entrenchment that is not too powerful. We noted above that as the face value of
commitment bonds approaches infinity, these bonds become increasingly
indistinguishable from straight legislative commitments.59 Bondholders will pay
almost nothing for a commitment bond with a face value of $100 trillion because
there is virtually no chance that the government would take any action that would
lead to so great a transfer of value. This is true even if the courts would enforce
such commitment bonds.
The courts could allow commitment bonds where there remains some
reasonable probability that the government will not meet its commitment. For
example, the courts might tolerate a statute that would condition the sale of
commitment bonds on receipt of at least 20% of their face value. It is difficult to
see how the courts could arrive at a nonarbitrary percentage, but this is a linedrawing problem that courts have overcome in other areas of constitutional law. 60
An approach along these lines should be especially attractive to those who worry
that allowing legislative entrenchment might produce flawed legislation that can
only be eliminated through constitutional amendment, as Posner and Vermeule
56

See id.
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547 (1983) (arguing
that Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem suggests that the concept of a single discernible legislative
intent may be a fiction).
58
An analogous doctrine is hard look review, and evidence suggests that judges’ political
affiliations affect decisionmaking in this context. See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein,
The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 767 (2008) (summarizing
empirical evidence in the EPA and the NLRB context).
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See discussion supra Subsection II.A.2., p. 24.
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See, e.g., Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010) (finding a previous holding governing
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Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (noting that in reviewing punitive damage awards, “singledigit multipliers are more likely to comport with due process”).
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note.61 Paying the price of breaking a commitment may be considerably more
viable than constitutional amendment.
Our goal is not to determine which approach is normatively the most
attractive. We believe, however, that our identification below of potentially useful
(though certainly controversial) applications of commitment bonds strengthens
the case for allowing at least some commitment bonds, even assuming that courts
would reject the Posner-Vermeule approach of permitting outright legislative
entrenchment.
Whether this is a satisfactory approach depends in part on how frequently
the legislature might be expected to entrench simply to cement the achievements
of transitory majorities. We suspect that purely political entrenchments via
commitment bonds would be rare. Posner and Vermeule argue that just as
legislatures enact sunset clauses because they value flexibility over stability, so
too ought legislatures be able to entrench legislation because they value stability
over flexibility. 62 Whatever the merits of this argument, the existence of sunset
clauses demonstrates that legislatures will not always seek as much legislative
entrenchment as possible. In fact, the median voter in a legislature may be willing
to enact legislation only if it sunsets. Often the median legislator will be willing to
enact legislation without a sunset clause, only if future legislatures retain
unfettered power to change the policy baseline. Thus even the majority party in a
legislature is constrained in achieving many substantive policy initiatives favored
by its leaders. In this way, political pressures should restrain Congress in using
commitment bonds.
3. Effects of Uncertainty about Constitutionality
Let us suppose that a particular commitment bond is unconstitutional,
either because all commitment bonds are unconstitutional or because there is a
problem with a particular one. In practice, what would be the implications of
unconstitutionality? Assuming that the commitment bond is structured so that the
government would receive money initially from bondholders and pay only if it
failed to achieve its objective, one can imagine attempts to block the legislation at
two different points in time. As one example, the constitutionality might be
challenged by a lawsuit seeking an injunction before the government accepts
money from the bondholders. Another challenge could be from the government
itself when the government must pay the bondholders for failure to live up to its
commitment. A full analysis is beyond our scope, but we can anticipate potential
problems for both challenges. Who would have standing to challenge the contract
initially? And can the government escape its obligations under a contract on the
61
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Posner & Vermeule, supra note 27, at 1691-92.
Id. at 1672.
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ground that it might have encouraged unconstitutional actions when in fact the
government failed to meet the intended goal?
We suspect that the obstacles to an ex post challenge are smaller than the
obstacles to an ex ante challenge. And yet for advocates of commitment bonds as
well as opponents, there is a strong argument for resolving the constitutionality of
commitment bonds ab initio. Supporters must worry that if there is some danger
that bondholders will not be repaid, the government cannot expect to receive as
much up front from issuing commitment bonds. 63 The government might try to
compensate for this by making a larger commitment than it otherwise would, but
it may be difficult to calculate how large a commitment to make to compensate
for legal uncertainty. Furthermore, the variance in outcomes would lower the
amount that potential bondholders will pay. Opponents, meanwhile, might prefer
to have the bonds invalidated before they have any constraining effect. Thus, if
possible, a legislature might want to facilitate a relatively early challenge to
commitment bonds, for example by granting statutory standing to any commercial
entity that would be indirectly adversely affected.64
B. Additional Challenges
The danger that the courts might refuse to enforce commitment bonds is
not the only obstacle to bondholders being paid. As discussed below, two other
challenges to the enforcement of governmental commitment bonds are the
possibilities of legislative reneging and negative bondholder influence.
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An alternative strategy for the government might be to place assets that would be used to pay
holders of commitment bond in escrow in another country, and provide that the bonds should be
adjudicated in that country’s legal system, with no deference to any rulings by the government’s
own courts. We doubt that the United States would adopt this strategy, but it might be sensible for
a country whose judicial system is not independent enough to ensure that any adjudication of
commitment bonds would be sufficiently fair. There should be no obstacle, so far as we can
identify, to U.S. courts adjudicating some other country’s commitment bonds. There have been
examples analogous to this in U.S. legal history. See, for example, the International Claims
Settlement Act, 22 U.S.C. § 1621 et seq., which creates the Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission (allowing U.S. nationals to bring claims against foreign nations); and the Alien Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006), which extends jurisdiction to foreign citizens bringing suit
for conduct occurring outside the United States.
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The difficulty will be constitutional standing doctrine. To bring a challenge, a plaintiff would
need to show inter alia an “injury in fact.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560
(1992). This might be satisfied by a showing that the government caused an immediate economic
injury by passing a statute authorizing the sale of commitment bonds.
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1. The Credibility of Governmental Commitment
There are a number of possible actions a legislature could take to retrench
on its commitment.65 For example, a legislature might pass a statute explicitly
extinguishing the rights of bondholders. Or a legislature might pass a statute that
violates a prior commitment but provides that it should not be interpreted as doing
so. If the legislature casually abandons commitments that it makes through
commitment bonds, then government use of such bonds will not be credible.
Bondholders will bid much less for the bonds than they otherwise would. The
legislature could respond by selling bonds purportedly worth even more to make
up for the shortfall, but this would likely make bondholders even more skeptical
that the legislature would ever pay up. After all, if the legislature seems unlikely
to pay up on a relatively small commitment to which it fails to adhere, it will
almost certainly not pay many more dollars for the same commitment.
Even if the legislature theoretically retained the power to renege on
commitment bonds, it might not do so. After all, reneging would establish a
precedent making it more likely that the government would renege in the future.
Auctions for new commitment bonds would then yield much less in revenue.
Similar logic helps explain why many borrowers pay off loans from creditors
even if it is unlikely that the creditors will sue them for the loans: they hope to be
able to borrow more in the future. Legislators may hope both to be able to
constrain themselves in the future and to raise money from such commitments. Of
course, legislators, like individuals, also may feel some ethical compulsion to
meet their promises to others even if they prove unable to meet their
commitments to themselves. It is thus possible that a legislature might make
credible commitments to pay bondholders should they fail to meet their own
commitments, even if the legislature legally may renege on its commitments.
However, this conclusion is far from certain. And a legislature that wishes
to sell commitment bonds could benefit if it could not renege on its commitments.
The most straightforward way to accomplish this is through a constitutional
provision that obliges the government to meet its commitments. In the United
States, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment66 as helping to serve this function. In Lynch v. United States, 67
Congress purported to cancel some rights under war risk insurance policies that it
had issued. The Court conceded that under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, 68
65

The Winstar case discussed above is not directly relevant here, because in that case, the
government claimed that it was not liable under the contract for its sovereign act, but did not
purport to extinguish its contractual obligations. See supra note 42.
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U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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292 U.S. 571 (1934).
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Congress could at any time withdraw its consent for the United States to be
sued.69 But it interpreted the cancellation of the insurance contracts as terminating
substantive contractual rights, not as withdrawing the right of contracting parties
to sue the United States for doing so.70 Admittedly this leaves open the possibility
that a later Congress could achieve a different result by simply purporting to
withdraw the right to sue without affecting the substantive contractual right.
Congress might be hesitant to take that step, however, as doing so could
undermine not only its ability to issue commitment bonds in the future but also to
make commitments to ordinary contracting partners.71
It is possible that courts eager to enhance the ability of the government to
enter into firm commitments would find some constitutional support for the
proposition that the government cannot escape its contractual commitments
(except where it has reserved the power to do so in the contract itself). For
example, courts might read the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause as
incorporating principles similar to those of the Contracts Clause, 72 which is
generally understood to apply only to the states,73 even though courts have
previously rejected this conclusion. Alternatively, courts might find support in the
Public Debt Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.74 This Clause appears to
protect conventional bonds issued by the United States,75 and it may also protect
other types of government debts.76 The question is whether the federal
government, by issuing commitment bonds on the credit of the United States,
69

See, e.g., id. at 581 (“Although consent to sue was thus given when the policy issued, Congress
retained power to withdraw the consent at any time. For consent to sue the United States is a
privilege accorded, not the grant of a property right protected by the Fifth Amendment.”).
70
Id. at 583 (“It seems clear that it intended to take away the right; and that Congress did not
intend to preserve the right and merely withdraw consent to sue the United States.”).
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See Harold J. Krent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1561
(1992).
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U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
73
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall enter into any . . . Law impairing the Obligation
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U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 4 (“The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized
by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing
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Though specifically targeted at Civil War debt, the Clause is written in general terms. See
Michael Abramowicz, Beyond Balanced Budgets, Fourteenth-Amendment Style, 33 TULSA L.J.
561, 582 (1997); see also Phanor J. Eder, A Forgotten Section of the Fourteenth Amendment, 19
CORNELL L.Q. 1, 15 (1933) (concluding that “the intention was to lay down a constitutional canon
for all time in order to protect and maintain the national honor and to strengthen the national
credit”).
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See Abramowicz, supra note 75, at 587-89 (arguing, through a focus on the “including” portion
of the Clause, that it protects some obligations besides bonds).
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would fall within this provision, and there is no historical evidence or case law
that produces a clear answer. There is, in short, enough support for American
courts to protect constitutionally a commitment that would make governmental
issuance of commitment bonds credible, but the courts might well choose not to
demand enforcement even if they do find commitment bonds constitutional.
2. Bondholder Political Influence
Another danger with commitment bonds is a political form of moral
hazard.77 Bondholders have an economic incentive to try to influence the political
process to ensure that the government does not meet its commitments. For
example, if the government commits to greater education expenditures, the
commitment bondholders might attempt to organize as a political force against
increased educational spending. The greater the value of a bond, the more
incentive bondholders will have to try to ensure that the government does not
meet its commitment. For example, they might give political contributions to
candidates who oppose the goal to which the government wishes to commit, or
sponsor mass advertising campaigns against the government’s goal.
There are three general approaches that the government might take to
reduce the danger that bondholders will use their political influence to thwart the
government’s commitment. The first is to restrict bond sales to entities that seem
unlikely to be able to influence the government. If, for example, foreigners are
precluded from making political contributions,78 then the government might sell
the bonds only to foreigners, and further provide that the bonds will be
unenforceable if they are later resold to American citizens.
A second approach, and likely a more practical one, would be to ensure
diffuse ownership of the commitment bonds. For example, the bonds could
stipulate that if at any time, an individual, entity or group or affiliated 79
individuals or entities comes to own at least two percent of the outstanding bonds,
the bonds owned in excess of that percentage will not be redeemable.
77

See generally KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 14 (1986) (defining moral hazard as the “tendency of an insured to underallocate
to loss prevention after purchasing insurance”).
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See 2 U.S.C. § 441e (2004) (banning contributions by foreigners); Citizens United v. Federal
Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 911 (2010) (reserving the question of whether the ban can be
justified by “a compelling interest in preventing foreign individuals or associations from
influencing our Nation’s political process”).
79
To count, an affiliation would need to relate to the bonds. If, for example, twenty percent of
bondholders happened to be members of the Roman Catholic Church, that presumably would not
be inconsistent with the diffusion requirement. An exception might be if the Church encouraged
its members to purchase commitment bonds and later donate them to the government. An
association of bondholders, more importantly, could trigger the penalty provisions.
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Enforcement of such a requirement might require the ability of the government to
investigate possible relationships among bondholders, but it seems plausible that a
government could prevent concentrated ownership with such penalty provisions.
The goal of diffusing ownership and preventing coordination among bondholders
is to ensure that there will be a free rider problem among the bondholders. Each
bondholder might like all bondholders donate to political organizations fighting
against the government’s commitment, but because each has only a small stake in
the issue, no bondholder is willing to invest personal resources to advancing this
common goal.
A third approach is to prohibit lobbying and related activities by
bondholders. It may be impractical to criminalize free speech, but the bonds could
provide that anyone who attempts to influence the government not to meet its
commitment shall be ineligible to cash any bonds or to transfer them to others.
The legislation might be drafted to be neutral, so that any lobbying in favor of the
government meeting its commitment would also prevent payment to the lobbying
party. The government could establish safe harbors, such as uncoordinated
political contributions to individual candidates up to a total of some value, and it
will presumably not be practical for the government to identify all de minimis
spending anyway. However, this approach should be sufficient to limit the ability
of third parties to engage in coordinated campaigns that seek to influence
government. The only type of coordination that the bonds should tolerate (indeed,
encourage) is coordination of efforts to enforce the bonds.
Some combination of these efforts seems likely to offset enough of any
increased incentive to thwart the government’s commitment so that the net effect
of a commitment bond will still be to make it more likely that the government will
meet its commitment than had it not sold commitment bonds. As long as the net
effect is in the direction of greater rather than less commitment, the government
could always increase the face value of the commitment bonds in order to ensure
that it achieves any desired total level of commitment. Of course, if the net effect
were to make it less likely that the government would meet its commitment, the
government could sell bonds that would pay off if the government made its
commitment. This would give private parties incentives to lobby for meeting the
commitment, and it could be more effective by insisting on relatively
concentrated ownership.
To assess the likely success of a commitment or anti-commitment bond,
the government (or any other individual or entity considering issuing commitment
bonds) could create a market test.80 Before definitively deciding on the
80

The mechanism described here is not the only market mechanism that could be used to make
this assessment. An alternative approach would be to use conditional prediction markets. See
MICHAEL ABRAMOWICZ, PREDICTOCRACY: MARKET MECHANISMS FOR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
DECISION MAKING 141-44, 199-204 (2008). An advantage of this approach is that it is difficult to
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commitment bonds device, the government could solicit orders for commitment
bonds contingent upon different total levels of commitment bond sales. For
example, it might conduct auctions for commitment bonds contingent on the
government’s agreeing to issue a total of $100,000, $100,000,000, or
$100,000,000,000.81 Or, it could ask bidders to submit their bids as a function of
the commitment bond level, so that it can assess demand for intermediate values.
The government would promise to refund the money paid at the auctions (with
interest) if it did not decide to go through with the sale of commitment bonds at
that level. Just as with goal-setting auctions,82 the prices at auction would allow
the government to obtain at least crude estimates of the market’s estimate of the
probability that the government would meet its commitment for different possible
levels of commitment bond sales. These estimates should be sufficiently accurate
to validate or discount the concern that the bonds might have offsetting or
negative consequences. The government also might use similar auctions to assess
the effects of different bond restrictions on the government’s likely success.
C. Functions of Governmental Commitment
If commitment bonds are a constitutionally permissible and effective
means of improving the government’s ability to commit to a course of action, then
there are several potential functions that commitment bonds legitimately might
serve (besides increasing the future resolve of the committing party).
Commitment bonds can credibly signal to third parties the government’s
commitment in a way that will induce beneficial conduct by third parties.
Commitment bonds can also facilitate political compromise where agreement is
impeded either by the need to resolve details or by the concern that a particular
approach might facilitate later legislative change.
1. Vindication of Higher-Order Principles
Just as we may believe that it makes sense to permit an individual to
commit his or her forward-looking self that wants to lose weight over a later self
that in the absence of a commitment would prefer to eat a piece of chocolate cake,
so too might we permit a forward-looking government to commit to some goal
that in the absence of the commitment it would gladly sacrifice when confronted
with some tempting legislation. One can support constitutions and oppose
manipulate prediction markets. See id. at 28-32.
81
The government need not take orders for the entire face value of the commitment bonds. For
example, to estimate demand for the $100 billion in bonds, it might solicit firm orders to buy only
$100 million in bonds. These firm orders would then become the first sales of the bonds should
the government then agree to sell $100 billion in bonds.
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governmental commitment bonds, or vice-versa, because the requirements for
creating or amending constitutions differ from the requirements for creating
commitment bonds. But commitment bonds may be a useful mechanism for
accomplishing subconstitutional commitments for limited periods of time,
especially when constitutions are difficult to amend or when some imperfect
degree of adherence to constitutional principles is deemed desirable.
As we discuss below, keeping a balanced budget and committing to (or
against) economic bailouts are two examples of this. Eugene Kontorovich has
noted that some constitutional provisions can be interpreted as liability rules
rather than as property rules to give the government the ability to override the
higher-order principles in the event of exigencies.83 Commitment bonds can
potentially extend this approach to contexts in which there would be no
identifiable party harmed by the government’s deviation from its commitment.
They also are more flexible than liability rule constitutional provisions, as
changing the amount of the commitment bond can allow the government to adjust
the degree of its commitment. This way, the government can make either small or
large commitments in a particular direction.
a. Budget Balance
Perhaps the most obvious application of commitment bonds, given past
interest in the issue, would be to encourage the government to commit to balanced
budgets. While voters may be able to understand the importance of limiting
deficits, they may end up supporting politicians who promise more spending and
lower taxes, blaming deficits on the spending and taxation choices of political
opponents.84 This may be because voters have limited information or because they
have limited self-control. Let us assume for the sake of argument that we should
prioritize voters’ beliefs in budget balance over their affection for deficit-financed
spending. How best to achieve this?
A constitutional amendment is one possibility, 85 and many jurisdictions
have constitutional provisions insisting on some form of budget balance. But it is
also possible to imagine subconstitutional approaches to balanced budget
commitment. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law86 sought to commit the
government to balanced budgets by providing for automatic spending reductions
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in the event that a budget was not in balance.87 Posner and Vermeule point out
that this is not a true legislative entrenchment,88 because Congress could in any
future legislation simply declare an exception to the balanced budget principle.
Other legislative approaches seeking to advance balanced budget goals, such as
pay-as-you-go requirements, are subject to the same problem. Thus, even if it
would be possible to overcome the difficulties with the statute that led the
Supreme Court to strike it down,89 an alternative approach to improving the
government’s ability to commit to balanced budgets might be desirable.
A simple commitment bonds approach would provide that if the
government runs a deficit in a particular year, it would be required to pay a fixed
amount to the holders of the commitment bonds. The commitment bonds could
include any exceptions, such as military or economic emergencies, that balanced
budget amendments also feature. But this provides no incentives to limit deficit
spending once the budget is already in deficit, and a great deal would depend on
whether the government is on one side or the other of the balanced budget line. A
preferable approach thus would be to make payments depend on the degree to
which the government runs a deficit. For example, the government might pay
$0.50 per dollar of deficit up to $100 billion, $1 per dollar for the next $150
billion, and so on. This would make it more expensive for the government to
engage in deficit spending, but it would not necessarily eliminate it altogether.
A significant potential challenge to the use of commitment bonds to
reduce the deficit is the possibility of accounting disputes potentially leading to
litigation. To the extent that bondholders anticipate litigation, they will pay less
for commitment bonds, so the seller of commitment bonds bears the full cost of
litigation (or, more precisely, its own actual cost, plus its opponents’ anticipated
costs). The challenge is to find mechanisms that make dispute resolution
relatively inexpensive, yet effective. Of course, balanced budget amendments face
similar challenges, and one possible approach is to borrow from the idea of
maintaining an “independent scorekeeper.”90 For example, an administrative
agency might be established to determine whether the government has run deficits
and to pay off bondholders. Judicial review of such decisions might be limited;
agency determinations ordinarily would be subject to the Administrative
Procedure Act’s “substantial evidence” test.91 Assuming that the courts would be
87
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relatively independent, this should make it difficult for the agency to stiff
bondholders. Meanwhile, as long as protections are taken to prevent bondholders
from influencing political processes, they also seem unlikely to be able to capture
the agency. 92
b. Bailouts
A balanced budget constraint is a commitment at the center of the
workings of government, but government also could use commitment bonds to
achieve narrower (yet still potentially important) purposes. Suppose, for example,
that Congress worried that the recent economic bailouts had created an
unacceptable level of moral hazard.93 Congress might then determine that it would
be beneficial to commit to not grant bailouts in the future. It might even do so as
to specific entities. For example, the government might decide that to prevent
excessive risk-taking by Fannie Mae, and to repudiate the widely accepted view
that the government implicitly backs its obligations, the government might enter
into a commitment bond that would pay off if it assumed any future Fannie Mae
obligations. The government might commit to paying a fixed sum in the event it
assumed any obligations, plus a variable amount depending on the degree of
obligations assumed.
Of course, our purpose is not to advocate for or against this approach.
Perhaps such a commitment would be ineffective in preventing excessive risktaking, and the government would then be unable to avoid economic disaster.
Perhaps there are better solutions, such as ensuring that no entity is too big to
fail94 and that the failure of one entity will not produce contagion. 95 But the
example highlights that it sometimes might be useful for the government to enter
into commitment bonds for the future at the same time as it does the opposite in
the present. Indeed, whenever there is concern that a governmental action would
create a bad precedent (in an informal, nonjudicial sense), the government might
92
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enter into a commitment bond to refrain from doing the same thing in the future.
Of course, if the commitment is justifiable then, it might well have been
justifiable earlier, but it may be better for the government to issue commitment
bonds than either to create a bad policy precedent or to avoid that precedent by
taking an action with large negative consequences in the present or near future.
This highlights an important point about commitment that is sometimes
overlooked. Often policy analysis proceeds on the assumption that the
government ought to do what it would have committed to at an earlier time had it
addressed an issue. For example, patent theorists seek to determine optimal ex
ante patent policy and may assume that legal ambiguities should be resolved
based on such theoretical considerations, but they do not consider that deviating
from these optimal rules in an anti-patent direction may be optimal because the
policy developed today will not affect invention in the past. Or, bankruptcy
theorists assess the incentives of bankruptcy on the capital markets without
acknowledging that many of the distributional effects of changes in the
bankruptcy laws will stem from contracts that people have already entered into.
Even when governmental commitment to some approach makes sense
prospectively, a different approach may make sense retrospectively when the
regulations have different incentive effects. The government might
simultaneously seek to tie its hands for the future and to untie the binds of the
past. Only when the latter task undermines the former task should the government
necessarily do now what it wants to commit to doing in the future.
Returning to the bailout context, consider an argument that is the reverse
of the one above, namely, that the government should commit to bailing out
institutions like Freddie Mac because this helps them maintain a low cost of
capital. (As this reversal emphasizes, our theory is agnostic about the appropriate
direction of bailout commitments.) This argument is distinct from the argument
that the government ought now bail out such institutions because they had an
implicit government guarantee. Suppose, for example, that the current costs of the
bailout of these institutions would exceed the present benefits. If an implicit
guarantee were the only type of government guarantee that were possible, then the
government would face a trade-off. Violating its implicit bailout guarantee would
weaken the credibility of prospective bailout guarantees. With this hypothetical,
the government’s optimal strategy is to break its previous guarantee while seeking
to strengthen its future guarantees.
Introduction of commitment bonds or some other explicit guarantee
mechanism can accomplish this. Even if the public no longer trusts the
government’s implicit commitments, the commitment bond mechanism will alter
the government’s incentives should a similar situation arise. If the government
does issue commitment bonds—either committing to bailing out or not bailing out
an institution—then it will not be as easy to evade the commitment should a
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situation later arise in which there is a tension between present expediency and
future commitment benefits. The benefit of commitment bonds is that the
government can increase the credibility of a claim that it will take a certain action
in the future regardless of the action that it takes in the present. But the cost is that
the government does this by genuinely constraining its options in the later period.
2. Signaling
The above examples of governmental commitment bonds are analogous to
an individual’s attempt to use commitment bonds to improve self-control, but
there may be signaling aspects as well. For example, an anti-bailout commitment
might be useful not only because the government worries that it will not have the
self control to ignore a failed enterprise, but also because it hopes to send a signal
that will discourage excessive risk-taking. The other commitments discussed
presumably also have some signaling function. The anti-deficits commitment may
reassure purchasers of federal debt that the government will be able to meet its
obligations. There are, however, situations in which the role of signaling may be
even larger.
Another example would be an anti-inflation commitment in monetary
policy. The literature on commitment mechanisms for monetary policy is welldeveloped, as economists have shown that signals of future policy themselves
affect social welfare. More specifically, inflation depends in part on expectations
of inflation.96 It matters not just how expansive monetary policy will be but also
how expansive the public believes monetary policy will be. So central bankers
can achieve better results if they persuade the public that they will take actions
that will tend to result in low inflation, whatever in fact they actually do
afterward. This leads to counterintuitive conclusions, such as that the President’s
optimal strategy is to choose a central banker who is relatively more concerned
about low inflation than the President is.97 Of course, this will be most effective if
the central bank is relatively independent, and so central bank independence is
also justified in part based on its anticipated effect on inflation expectations. 98
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Central bank independence and selection of a conservative central banker are thus
examples of non-compensating commitment mechanisms.
A compensating approach would be for the bonds to specify an inflation
target and promise payment for every basis point by which inflation is exceeded.
(Ideally, the inflation rate itself should be measured by an agency independent
from both the central bank and executive control.) Especially to the extent that
bondholders are outside of the country, this changes the central banker’s calculus,
leading the central banker to err on the side of low inflation more than he or she
otherwise would. It is possible that commitment bonds could be set too high,
leading to inefficiently low inflation or even deflation, especially when the effects
of policy on inflation are uncertain. But in theory, there is some optimal level of
commitment bonds, taking into account factors including the degree to which
inflation depends on inflation expectations.
That does not necessarily mean that commitment bonds are the best
approach for committing to an anti-inflation policy. There will be some cost to
commitment bonds, as the payments received ex ante from bondholders will be
somewhat less than the expected ex post payments to bondholders, as a result of
the risk that the bondholders are assuming. Choosing a relatively conservative
central banker is simpler. But a virtue of anti-inflation commitment bonds is that
they do not require the appointment of unaccountable officials who are chosen
precisely because they will tend to make decisions that the executive will not like.
Additionally, a danger of central bank independence is that it may become
difficult to replace officials for reasons other than their degree of commitment to
low inflation. Meanwhile, anti-inflation commitment bonds may be superior to
mechanical commitments to low inflation policy, such as the constant growth rate
rule championed by Milton Friedman. 99 This is because anti-inflation commitment
bonds allow the central banker flexibility to consider all economic circumstances
in formulating monetary policy.
Monetary policy is frequently cited in the economic literature as an
example of policy that is optimally time inconsistent. Policy is time consistent if
one would make the same decisions whether committing to a policy path at the
outset (assuming full information availability) or making policy decisions at each
point in time. Inflation policy is time inconsistent because one’s incentive is to
commit to a stricter anti-inflation policy for any particular factual circumstance
than one would like to choose if that circumstance actually arises. Another classic
example of time-inconsistent policy is government flood relief. 100 The timeinconsistent policy is to be more cold-hearted than one would be after a flood has
99
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occurred, because one would like homebuilders to internalize costs of their
location decisions. Commitment bonds requiring the government to pay third
parties some multiple of whatever they pay flood victims could credibly move the
government closer to the time-inconsistent policy by signaling to the public that
the government will not be as willing to provide relief.
The flood example illustrates how a government can use commitment
bonds to make conditional commitments. With a conditional commitment bond,
the bondholders will be paid only if some contingency occurs (flood) and the
government fails to meet its commitment to act in a certain way (not
compensating). As another example, a country could commit to reducing certain
tariffs if another country takes some specified actions to open trade.101 The
revenues from such bonds would be discounted to reflect both the probability that
either condition will not be met (in the trade example, the possibilities that one
country would not take the specified action or that the committing country would
not follow through on its commitment would both decrease auction revenue).
Alternatively, the government might agree to reimburse bondholders if the first
condition is not met. An advantage of doing so is that it would be easier to tell
from the bond prices what bondholders think the probability of the government
meeting its commitment is should the contingency arise.
3. Facilitating Political Compromise
Commitment bonds can be used not only to send signals to third parties,
but also to improve the operation of the legislature itself by facilitating political
compromise. There are at least two means by which commitment bonds can
achieve this. First, legislatures unable to agree on all the details of legislation may
enact provisional legislative agreements in which they commit to resolving
additional issues at a later time. This reduces the chance that strategic bargaining
may scuttle attempts at a full resolution. The commitment would be to pass
legislation having specific features or meeting identified objectives. By increasing
the cost of failing to enact legislation, such a commitment reduces the chance that
political adversaries will use some minor issue as reason to withhold support for a
compromise. Second, commitment bonds may be used to alleviate the concerns of
a group worried that prospective legislation might lead to later legislation that
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they would oppose. A commitment bond could be used to make it relatively costly
for a later legislature to enact that later legislation. This would compensate for any
increase in the probability of that later legislation’s occurrence resulting from the
initial legislative steps.
a. Provisional Legislative Agreements
In a provisional legislative agreement commitment bond, the legislature
commits to enacting legislation that includes some specified features. It may be
useful when a majority of the legislature agrees on certain aspects of a legislative
compromise but cannot agree on the details. By committing to agree later on more
detailed legislation, the legislature reduces the competing factions’ incentives to
engage in strategic bargaining, thus enhancing the chance that at least some form
of agreement is reached. The statute enacting a provisional legislative agreement
itself need not have any binding effect beyond the commitment to pay those who
purchase the bonds. This helps explain why it may be more beneficial than a
statute that simply sets forth what the competing factions have agreed upon. A
statute that simply sets forth vague commitments may be unworkable, meaning
that the country will pay a heavy price in litigation and uncertainty if the
legislature is unable to reach an agreement. The commitment bonds also ensure
that there will be a heavy price for failure to agree, with the bondholders’
payment compensating for this.
Suppose, for example, that a legislature is negotiating immigration reform.
A majority may have agreed that the country will increase the number of
immigrants that it allows in the country to some threshold by some date, and that
the country will increase its enforcement of rules against illegal immigration so
that the number of illegal immigrants will be no greater than a specified number
by that date. But there might be critical disagreements, such as whether there will
be an amnesty for current illegal immigrants, as well as countless disagreements
on less divisive issues, such as how many immigrants each country will be
allotted. The government could commit to increasing the number of immigrants
and reducing the number of illegal immigrants by the specified numbers. The
commitment bonds allow the legislature to increase the chance of achieving a
more complete resolution of an issue.
Even if provisional legislative agreement commitment bonds were to
become an accepted and frequently used legislative tool, it will not always be easy
to reach provisional legislative agreements. Sometimes, it might be obvious that
the provisional agreement will tend to favor one faction over another. For
example, there might be widespread agreement on certain aspects of some future
health care reform but a gulf on a key issue (say, whether a health reform plan
should include a “public option”). If a slight majority of legislators favor a public
option, then opponents of a public option might worry that commitment bonds

COMPENSATING COMMITMENTS

41

ultimately will force them to give up on the issue, and so it will not be possible to
persuade them to support the issuance of such bonds. Commitment bonds will be
more feasible when there is some plausible middle ground on an issue or
compromises that might be made to facilitate agreement. Risk-averse politicians
might eschew commitment bonds especially if there would be a potential
“winner” and “loser” resulting from their issuance.
b. Sanding of Slippery Slopes
One reason for difficulty in passing legislation is that one faction may
worry that the legislation, though itself beneficial, might have adverse
consequences later on. For example, consider the issue of the government
possibly creating a gun registry so that it can better track handgun ownership and
solve crimes.102 Some gun rights activists may not in principle be opposed to the
government having this information and may even favor the government using
such information to punish the illegal use of guns. But they might worry that this
will make it easier for a later legislature to take the further step of confiscating
guns via a gun ban.
A commitment bond requiring the government to pay a large sum to third
parties should it ever ban guns altogether might help to provide enough support
for the registry step. In effect, the commitment bond adds sand to the slippery
slope, making it more difficult for later legislatures to slip down. And the steeper
the legislation makes a slope, the more sand will be needed to prevent slippage.
Importantly, the commitment bond can provide this sand regardless of the
underlying reason that the slope is slippery. Eugene Volokh has identified at least
six different reasons that a gun registry might facilitate a gun ban. 103 Even if the
reason for the slippery slope is not that gun registration makes confiscation
cheaper, the expense of commitment bonds will make a later legislature hesitate
to enact them. Volokh offers some mechanisms for countering slippery slopes in
general, including making the policy at the bottom of the slippery slope
unconstitutional or at least ensuring that the Constitution does not mandate sliding
down the slippery slope,104 but commitment bonds provide a more general
solution.
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A challenge to the use of commitment bonds in the gun registration
context is that the bonds might need to be permanent if they are to be sufficiently
attractive to gun rights supporters, who may be concerned about the long-term
survival of freedom and thus have a long time horizon.105 This is not necessarily
true, as even commitment bonds that will last only a couple of decades might lead
gun rights supporters, or at least median legislators, to conclude that the bonds
sufficiently decrease the chance of a gun ban. And by doing so, the bonds might
make the overall legislative package attractive. There is no technical barrier to
permanent commitment bonds or commitments for the distant future; the bonds
can specify that they will pay off whenever some contingency comes to pass. Of
course, commitments for the distant future will receive less at auction because of
discounting, though legislators presumably also discount the cost of
commitments. Indeed, a concern about permanence may be that self-interested
legislators will discount distant future commitments more than bondholders,
because the legislators will not likely be in office when the bill comes due. It may
be too easy to sell out the future for a small present advantage. This is, of course,
a problem in other contexts as well, 106 but commitment bonds aggravate the
concern.
A danger is that permanent commitment bonds or commitment bonds for
the long-term future may simply be unsustainable, especially if the legislature
enters into such a commitment lightly. There is then a danger that the
commitment bonds will simply be a mechanism for deferring a problem to the
future. This would establish an unrealistic policy baseline that will impose high
costs on a future legislature in much the same way that deficit spending may
burden future generations. As a prudential matter, it may make sense for the
government to sell commitment bonds only when the auction revenues suggest
that there is a reasonably high chance that the government will be able to meet its
commitment.107 The government could ensure this by auctioning separate
commitment bonds for different periods and comparing auction revenues to the
discounted potential payout. It would then cancel an auction (or perhaps all of the
auctions) if the auction revenues were so high that it appeared that there was a
sufficiently high chance that the government would not be able to meet its
105
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commitment. This approach provides some incentive for potential bondholders to
imagine different possible states of the future world and consider carefully what
legislators may not, whether or not it makes sense to make that long-term
commitment. For example, bondholders would consider whether gun control
would be more or less useful in the future.108
III. MUTUAL COMMITMENT BONDS

In all of the examples so far, a single entity has attempted to make a
commitment by selling commitment bonds. In some of these examples, the
purpose underlying the commitment related to a relationship between that party
and another party, such as one party using a commitment bond to communicate a
signal to another party. Our examples showed that, however, even in the signaling
case, it is not essential that the commitment be entered into as a contractual
concession to another party. Cooter and Porat disguise the heart of the antiinsurance contract, which is the relationship between a committing party and a
third party, by focusing instead on the relationship between a promisor and a
promisee. 109 For example, when a manufacturer sells a commitment bond to a
third party with a promise to pay that third party when the manufacturer’s
products break, it is largely irrelevant whether the manufacturer agrees to do this
in its contract with the consumer or binds itself in advance of entering into
agreements with consumers.
It might then seem that considering mutual commitments—in which each
of two or more parties individually agrees to enter into a commitment—would
add no more to the analysis and would merely focus on the subset of cases that
Cooter and Porat have already carefully and cleverly analyzed. 110 True, when
parties enter into such mutual commitments, the effects are essentially the sum of
the effects of the individual commitments. What is new about mutual commitment
bonds is that each party entering into the agreement agrees to constrain itself
because it wants another party to constrain itself. One party’s commitment is the
consideration for another’s.
As a simple example, each of two married individuals might be happy
with his or her own weight, but each wants the other to lose weight. Thus, the
108
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couple might agree contractually that both will enter simultaneously into weight
loss commitment contracts. This might be superior to a more standard bet or
contractual arrangement between the parties, who might share a bank account and
in any event might want each to encourage the other to lose weight rather than to
gain it. 111 There are alternatives to the use of commitment bonds in this example
that could provide similar ex post incentives, but, without the compensatory
payment provided by commitment bonds, the cost of constraint may be too high.
For example, two parties entering into a mutual commitment could simply
promise that each will give money to a third party if either of the committing
parties fails to live up to its commitment. The possibility of receiving either some
up-front compensation from the third party or compensation in the event of
success would make this arrangement considerably more attractive.
An appreciation of the possibility of mutual commitment bonds, however,
points to some general classes of problems that the bonds can solve and for which
simple contractual penalty provisions will be ineffective. One set of cases in
which mutual commitment bonds may be useful are those in which multiple
entities collectively wish to send a signal to third parties, but the possibility of
renegotiation undermines the effectiveness of the signal. Other cases in which the
bonds may be useful are those in which parties’ conduct is not easily measurable,
and those in which the parties have not yet entered into a contract with one
another. Section III.A develops these classes in more detail, and Section III.B
explores potential legal applications of mutual commitment bonds among private
parties as well as among governments to develop these points further.
A. Reasons for Mutual Commitment
1. Group Signaling
The motivation for mutual commitment bonds most akin to that for single
entity commitment bonds is the idea that a group of entities may wish collectively
to signal or credibly convey information about their future behavior. For example,
suppose that a group of electricity generators is concerned about the possibility
that the government might devise costly command-and-control regulations to
reduce pollution. The coalition wishes to show that it will reduce pollution to
socially desired levels without government interference. It might then sell
commitment bonds requiring each member of the group to pay some large fine to
a third party if that member fails to meet its individual goal. 112 Once again, the
111
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commitment bonds device lowers the cost of credible commitment to a particular
goal (in this case, reduced emissions), because of the payments received by each
member of the group.
The only difference this rationale has from the signaling rationale explored
in Subsection II.C.2. is that a group of separate nongovernmental entities rather
than a single governmental entity is entering into the commitment. If an entity is
nothing but a nexus of contracts,113 this is a meaningless distinction. Nonetheless,
there are some particular challenges to using commitment bonds to send a signal
in this context. One is that it may be difficult to reach an agreement. When a
single entity sells commitment bonds, it need not ordinarily decide which
subentity would bear the cost of failure. With multiple legally distinct entities, an
agreement must be made about how great a commitment each must make. This
can be challenging, as each entity may argue for a lower commitment from itself.
At the same time, the commitment bonds mechanism inherently alleviates the
problem to some extent, because entities that make deeper commitments will
receive larger upfront payments. The mechanism also alleviates the need for
continued negotiation among the parties. After the commitments are entered into,
each party has an incentive to lower its pollution, and we need not worry about
internal conflicts among the entities in determining how self-regulation should
proceed.
An alternative to mutual commitment bonds is to have each of a number
of a group make commitments to one another. For example, one might imagine a
contract among a group of electricity users, with each user promising to pay the
others some amount of money if the user fails to meet a conservation goal. In fact,
a version of this mutual bond exists in the form of the Chicago Climate
Exchange. 114 An advantage mutual commitment bonds have over this approach is
that they greatly reduce the risk of nonenforcement. Each member of a group may
be hesitant to sue another member, for fear that it will itself be sued, and so there
is a danger that all members of a group will tacitly agree to ignore a goal. This
danger will be greater the more homogeneous the group is. Mutual commitment
bonds grant the enforcement power to one or more third parties who have no
reason to fear retaliation, and so the signal sent by the multiple entities will be
more credible, and the incentives to meet the goal will be stronger.
113
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Mutual commitment bonds also may be useful when it is not possible or
practical to assign an individual goal for each member of a group, but possible to
establish a collective goal. Suppose, for example, that a number of factories lie
alongside a river, and it appears that at least one of these factories is polluting the
river above legal limits. The government threatens to impose a much more
stringent and expensive monitoring regime. The factories might agree to enter into
a mutual commitment bond that would require each factory owner to pay a large
fine if pollution exceeds a particular level, regardless of whether that factory
owner can be proven responsible. If each factory agrees to pay for the entire
liability of pollution, then each factory will have optimal deterrence incentives
with respect to its own activities.115 Ordinarily, of course, it would be hard to
convince the factories to agree to such an arrangement, but the prospect of
receiving upfront payments might make the signaling incentive more attractive.
Meanwhile, individual factories that are not engaging in excessive pollution might
propose such an arrangement as a way of credibly signaling that they individually
are not responsible and perhaps exposing those who refuse as the likely
wrongdoers. Only firms expecting to bear the cost of changing their polluting
activity would have a strong incentive to reject such a proposal.
2. Unverifiable Conduct
The factories example also helps illustrate a second situation in which
mutual commitment bonds may be helpful: when individual actors engage in
conduct that can benefit or harm other actors, but the legal system cannot easily
identify such conduct. A similar example can illustrate how such a mutual
commitment bond might be useful even in the absence of costs borne by anyone
outside the group. Suppose that some fixed number of fishermen own a lake, but
overfishing by one or more unknown fishermen is reducing collective welfare.
Assume further that there are no simple mechanisms for detecting the identity of
people overfishing, but that it is possible to accurately estimate the stock of fish
remaining in the lake at the end of the season. The fishermen might agree to enter
into mutual commitment bonds in which everyone will be required to pay an
escalating amount of money to a third party as the stock of fish falls below some
set level. This could be sufficient to deter each fisherman from exceeding its
quota, because the profits from overfishing might be less than the payment in the
event of failure to reach the collective goal.
Mutual commitment bonds may analogously be used to encourage
unverifiable investments that will benefit two or more individuals in a group. The
problem of unverifiable investment is a staple of the literature on the economics
115
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of contracts,116 which recognizes that contracts are often incomplete and that
courts often will not be able to determine whether parties have acted well or
badly. Perhaps the paradigmatic relationship in which it is difficult for courts to
assess parties’ conduct is marriage. In marriage, each party may have suboptimal
incentives to engage in activities benefiting the marriage (e.g., taking out the
trash, buying small gifts for the partner), because each party receives only half the
benefits of a strong marriage. Similarly, parties may have excessive incentives to
engage in activities that harm the marriage: of two married individuals, the
adulterer alone benefits from cheating, while both spouses will share the negative
consequences.
In principle, mutual commitment bonds can help solve this problem. A
couple might agree to sell mutual commitment bonds that would require a
payment to the bondholder in the event of divorce or separation. Such an
approach in principle can increase the incentives of each party to a marriage to
make the marriage work, as it would force each spouse to internalize more of the
costs of marital failure. Some legal devices may achieve similar effects by
imposing costs on divorcing parties—for example, by requiring parties to remain
married for some period of time after initially seeking divorce117—but they offer
couples no upfront benefit for entering into a commitment. This example is an
application of Cooter and Porat’s insight that anti-insurance can help reduce
moral hazard.118 Mutual commitment bonds, however, can be used whether or not
the broader relationship is cemented by contract: individuals prohibited by law
from marrying, for example, might be compensated in advance for entering into
mutual commitment bonds that would require them to pay a third party if they
cease living together.
Of course, our purpose is not to insist that there is a significant market for
mutual commitment bonds by married couples, but rather to illustrate how these
bonds may be useful in any relationship in which an individual party may not
fully internalize the costs and benefits of his, her, or its actions. For example,
mutual commitment bonds could be useful in some contractual settings. Suppose
that two contracting parties are to work together on some project. There may be a
danger that each will work less than is optimal, especially if a court would not be
able to identify who shirked in the event that the project is unsuccessful. A mutual
commitment bond, promising to achieve some goal for the project as a whole, can
help reduce shirking by giving each party a greater stake in project success.
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3. Strategic Bargaining
In both the group signaling and unverifiable conduct scenarios, the parties
use mutual commitment bonds in a cooperative venture to avoid shirking. But
mutual commitment bonds may also be useful when parties’ interests are directly
adverse. Consider two parties that are disputing ownership of some property.
They may have at least one interest in common: the interest in reducing
bargaining costs. Entering into a mutual commitment bond can advance that
common interest, and the agreement to the mutual bond need not be part of a
contract resolving all or even any of their differences. For example, the parties
might agree to a contract in which each promises to pay a third party some
amount of money (say, $100,000) if they fail to reach some settlement about the
property ownership. Once again, they could agree to such a contract in the
absence of upfront payments, but the possibility of failure might then make such a
commitment uneconomical.
Such an agreement can reduce a party’s incentives to engage in strategic
bargaining that might threaten an agreement. For example, sometimes it might
make sense for a party in a negotiation to reject a reasonable offer and even
terminate negotiations in an effort to try to convince the other party that it
genuinely believes that its offer is unreasonable. Bluffing is a familiar tactic in
negotiation by a party seeking to capture as much of the surplus of an agreement
as possible. The danger is that sometimes, such tactics, especially when engaged
in by both parties, may prevent the parties from reaching an agreement at all, or at
least delay reaching an agreement. A party deciding whether to bluff must weigh
the expected cost of bargaining failure against the expected additional surplus
received. A mutual commitment bond increases the cost of bargaining failure,
thus making it less likely that a party will engage in strategic bargaining behavior,
or at least reducing the extent to which parties engage in such behavior.
A simple numeric example can illustrate the virtues of mutual
commitment bonds relative to other commitment devices. Suppose that A and B
are negotiating over how to split $100,000. If they cannot reach an agreement,
neither receives any money. Let us suppose that each estimates that by walking
away from the table at a critical point in negotiations, there will be a 10% chance
that the party will be able to receive $65,000 instead of $50,000, with a 2%
increase in the chance of bargaining failure (i.e., 4% if both parties walk away).
With these numbers, each party will have an incentive to walk away from the
bargaining table. (The expected benefit of walking away, 0.10 * $15,000 =
$1,500, is greater than the expected cost, 0.02 * $50,000 = $1,000.) The expected
loss from strategic bargaining is 0.04 * $100,000 = $4,000. However, if the
parties enter into a mutual commitment bond in which each must pay more than
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$25,000 in the event that they fail to reach an agreement by the deadline, then
neither will have an incentive to engage in strategic bargaining.
As developed so far, it might appear that the parties could fare equally
well by simply making a commitment to pay more than $25,000 each to a charity
in the event that they fail to reach an agreement. Because this commitment would
be a sufficient deterrent, they would never have to pay it, and the mutual
commitment bond is overkill. But suppose that even with commitment, there is a
significant residual chance of bargaining failure, say 10%. (Thus, if one party
walks away, there is a 12% chance, and if both parties walk away, 14%.) In this
case, the parties’ combined total expected payment to the charity would be equal
to $5,000. This amount is greater than the $4,000 expected loss from strategic
bargaining, and it would not be rational (philanthropic motivations aside) for the
parties to make the commitment to the charity. But if the parties receive a
combined $5,000, or even somewhat less, from a third party that purchases the
mutual commitment bond, then the transaction will be mutually advantageous.
Of course, in real world situations, each party will not have full
information about the other party’s incentives. Strategic bargaining will often
occur when each party is uncertain about how costly bargaining failure will be for
the other. Each party seeks to demonstrate that it will not be harmed much by
bargaining failure. This may make it hard to enter into negotiations to sell mutual
commitment bonds. Nonetheless, it may sometimes be easier to enter into mutual
commitment bonds (perhaps with each party putting at risk a different amount)
than to resolve the underlying bargaining issue. Mutual commitment bonds are
cheap in expected value terms because of the benefit to the parties in the event of
success. It may also sometimes be feasible to enter into mutual commitment
bonds well in advance of a negotiation, when strategic bargaining may be less
likely.
B. Applications
Our examples of mutual commitment bonds so far have been mostly
abstract, designed to illustrate how mutual commitment bonds can address a range
of theoretical problems. In this section, we offer some more concrete applications.
Our purpose, however, is not so much to advocate them; whether these proposals
would be practical depends on a range of considerations beyond the scope of this
Article. Rather, the purpose is to demonstrate simply how the possibility of
mutual commitment bonds creates new possibilities for institutional
arrangements. We will consider first a private context and then a governmental
one.
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1. Commitments among Private Parties
We have already seen that mutual commitment bonds can be used to
reduce the incidence of strategic bargaining in negotiations. Settlement
discussions are a type of negotiation, and so mutual commitment bonds could be
used to decrease strategic bargaining and increase the likelihood of settlement.
For example, the parties could agree that if a case goes to trial, each party would
pay a fixed amount of money to the purchaser of a commitment bond. As in any
other negotiation, this would reduce the risk that a party would hold out to extract
a relatively high proportion of the bargaining surplus. 119
A principal challenge to reaching such an agreement is adverse
selection.120 The danger is that parties who expect to have a good chance of
settling their lawsuits will sell mutual commitment bonds, depressing the price
that purchasers will pay. It may be difficult for third parties to estimate accurately
the chance of legal settlement, especially when litigants selling mutual
commitment bonds should be united in their desire to persuade third parties that
settlement is relatively unlikely. Perhaps a third party can participate in some
form of due diligence, scrutinizing the paperwork in both parties’ legal offices
with their consent and with confidentiality assurances. Mutual commitment bonds
may be most feasible when there is relatively little private information about
litigation. But when there is relatively little private information, there will be
relatively little asymmetric information between the parties, and the probability of
settlement will be relatively high anyway.
Mutual commitment bonds thus may be a more useful mechanism for
limiting litigation when agreed upon in advance, for example, as part of a system
of arbitration. If the sale of mutual commitment bonds is mandatory in some
arbitration setting, then the adverse selection problem is greatly mitigated.121
Purchasers of mutual commitment bonds will still face uncertainty about how to
value them, but they need not worry that the bonds are being sold only because
the sellers know that they will have relatively little value. Arbitration systems
sometimes use other mechanisms to encourage settlement; for example, final offer
arbitration encourages settlement by giving parties incentives to reveal their
119

See Geoffrey P. Miller, Preliminary Judgments, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 165, 175 (“Another
impediment to settlement is the possibility that strategic bargaining may prevent the parties from
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for both to settle.”).
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Cf. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
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honest views of litigation prospects.122 Mutual commitment bonds could be a
complement to or substitute for other mechanisms that arbitration systems use to
reduce legal costs.
A problem with mandating the use of mutual commitment bonds in
advance might be that it would be difficult to foresee the optimal size of the
mutual commitment bond. The size presumably depends on the stakes in the
litigation. For example, suppose that two parties are required to each sell
$1,000,000 commitment bonds for litigation in which $1,000 is at stake.
Litigation will almost certainly be averted, but the merits of the case will likely
have little bearing on the settlement value. Factors such as which party can more
easily sustain a loss of $1,000,000 are likely to be as or more important in driving
settlement negotiations. Even if the claim is frivolous, it seems likely that many
defendants would happily settle for $500 rather than risk paying $1,000,000.
Because mutual commitment bonds can affect settlement dynamics, it is
important for them to be set at levels that are neither too small to encourage
settlement nor so large as to distort settlement.
One possible solution would be for parties to agree to sell mutual
commitment bonds where each party promises to pay to a third party an amount
equal to the other party’s legal expenses. 123 This would be useful in cases where a
party in litigation may take some action, such as filing a discovery request, which
is relatively cheap for it but relatively expensive for the opposing party. Parties
may not take such actions if they expected to bear the cost of compliance with
their request. With this approach to mutual commitment bonds, each party will
expect to bear the full cost of litigation, including its own expenses and its
opponents, and thus the full cost of any escalation of the litigation. Even with this
approach, parties may spend too much from the parties’ joint perspective, because
neither party will take into account that any advantage that it seeks to obtain for
itself will come at the expense of the other party. But mutual commitment bonds
should still help limit legal expenses and encourage settlement.
With this variation, advance agreement to sell mutual commitment bonds
is especially important. If one party is expected to bear less litigation expenses
than the other, then it would be unlikely to agree to such an arrangement once
litigation materializes. But even where legal costs are asymmetric, contracting
parties might be able to reach an agreement on mutual commitment bonds as part
of broader contract negotiations. From a social perspective, mutual commitment
bonds that require each party to bear both parties’ litigation costs should be
122
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especially welcomed, because this will reduce the possibility that asymmetric
litigation costs will distort settlement values. That does not mean that it would be
socially beneficial for a legislature to require all parties to issue mutual
commitment bonds. The bonds may, for example, tend to disadvantage parties
that are relatively risk-averse and relatively liquidity constrained.
While parties may sometimes agree both to mutual commitment bonds and
to some form of arbitration, advance agreement to mutual commitment bonds
alone may have some advantages over agreement to arbitration alone. First, there
is a danger that arbitration may tend to favor one party over other parties. A
common criticism of arbitration, especially where mandated in form contracts, is
that arbitrators may have some incentive to favor the party that has a greater
ability to influence the contract in the future. Because mutual commitment bonds
do not change the relevant legal decisionmakers, they may lead to less change in
substantive outcomes. Second, a principal goal of arbitration is to lower legal
costs, but this can be hard to achieve. Lowering the cost of trial (or completed
arbitration), for example, increases the chance that parties will be willing to go to
trial, offsetting any cost savings. The mutual commitment bonds approach seeks
to reduce total legal costs by raising the parties’ ex post legal costs from
continuing and escalating litigation. With the compensating payments from sale
of the mutual commitment bonds, parties paradoxically should end up with lower
legal costs. It is plausible that increasing the individual costs of litigation could
reduce the total cost even without mutual commitment bonds, but the case is
much stronger when the parties receive their expected increase in costs through
payments from the bond purchaser.
An agreement to sell mutual commitment bonds may also encourage
litigating parties to agree to other forms of arbitration, even when they might not
have been able to agree on arbitration initially. Often, it is difficult to generate an
agreement to arbitration once a lawsuit materializes, because one party might be
expected to benefit more than the other from arbitration. But roughly doubling
legal fees will increase the incentives of parties to agree on means of lowering
fees. Perhaps the party that would be relatively disadvantaged by arbitration might
agree to it in exchange for some concession (for example, an agreement that any
damages ultimately granted would be reduced or increased by a modest
percentage). Short of arbitration, parties might negotiate agreements to reduce the
cost of discovery. 124 They might even agree by contract to implement some
additional form of fee-shifting.
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2. Commitments among Governments
If governments can use commitment bonds to make commitments in much
the same way as any single entity, so too can two or more governments agree to
enter into mutual commitment bonds as a way of enforcing their agreements to
one another. For example, commitment bonds could serve as a remedial
mechanism for violations of bilateral or multilateral accords. For example,
governments could use mutual commitment bonds as a mechanism to police trade
disputes. Suppose that Countries A and B have entered into a bilateral tariffreduction agreement. The countries could agree that each will auction
commitment bonds, with payoffs equal to some multiple of the damages suffered
by the other country in the event of a violation of the agreement. 125 Importantly,
the countries would need to agree on the forum in which disputes would be
adjudicated; for example, a neutral country or an international organization such
as the WTO might decide disputes. There may be some danger that a country
would simply ignore the decision of the adjudicator, but the fact that this would
undermine the nation’s ability to enter into commitments with commitment bonds
in the future may make this less likely. Requiring each country to place
substantial assets in escrow could also eliminate the concern about
noncompliance.
What is most distinctive about this approach is that complaints would be
brought by the third party bondholders rather than by the offended state. There are
potential advantages and disadvantages to this. An advantage is that there is less
risk of trade violations causing international friction. Of course, a wronged state
might still complain about violations of treaty obligations, but because it would
have no direct role in the enforcement process, it would be easier for each country
to offer a muted official response.126
The use of commitment bonds would also represent a change in the
remedy for trade violations. Under current WTO procedures, a country whose
trade rights have been violated is permitted to retaliate against the offending
state.127 Critics have argued that the remedy aggravates the original offense,
125
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leading to reduced trade.128 Defending the approach, Jide Nzelibe has argued that
the mechanism cleverly takes advantage of the domestic political power of
protectionist interests in the wronged state and of exporters in the offending state
to ensure that trade rights will be enforced and that violators will yield to the
adjudicator.129
Mutual commitment bonds should make money damages more attractive,
however. Ordinarily, a country may be hesitant to enter into a treaty regime in
which it might need to pay money damages. Legislators may focus more on
bottom-line budget numbers than on social welfare, and so they may be more
willing to tolerate trade retaliation against domestic industry than an equivalent
fine. (Of course, this also suggests that monetary damages can have stronger
deterrent properties.) The upfront payment that each country should receive from
selling mutual commitment bonds may balance the concern about making a later
payment in the event of a trade violation. This is especially likely to make a
difference if legislators have high or even hyperbolic discount rates,130 embracing
an immediate infusion into the treasury even when accompanied by a
commitment in the future that is likely to be somewhat greater in expected value
terms.
As each nation would issue its own bonds, these general considerations
can be extended easily to multilateral disputes as well as to disputes in areas other
than trade. Conceivably, two nations engaged in physical hostilities might seek to
use mutual commitment bonds to enforce a peace accord. Whatever the merits of
nations enforcing their treaty rights through trade retaliation, alternatives to
military retaliation could be beneficial. A country might be more willing to resist
a military response to a perceived violation of an agreement if it knew that third
party bondholders would extract a monetary payment. And countries may be more
willing to enter into peace accords in the first place if they know that meeting
their obligations will provide a financial windfall. Of course, all this depends on
warring nations’ being able to commit sufficiently well to paying bondholders,
which may be impractical for states with limited resources to place in escrow and
no history of commitment to the rule of law.131
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CONCLUSION

This article has sketched a dizzying array of contexts in which committing
parties could seek ex ante compensation for taking on a potential risk of making
ex post payments if they fail to live up to their commitments. What is more, we
have identified a family of incentive-equivalent structures, which vary the timing
of contingent and non-contingent cash flows in order to implement these
commitments. While the idea of uncompensated commitment devices has been
well-understood for decades, the simple but powerful enhancement of fair-bet
compensation holds the prospect of substantially reducing the cost of making
commitments.
Our goal has not been to provide the nitty-gritty details of implementation,
but instead, to provoke a sense of the scope and potential for helping individuals,
entities, and even nation states to better achieve their goals. But for those who are
skeptical that commitment compensation could never work in practice, we end
with this motivating example of what may have been the world’s first ex ante
implementation of a compensating commitment bond.
On February 22, 2008, James Hurman, a thirty-year-old New Zealander,
posted a short video on YouTube offering to “hand over my right to smoke,”
promising to pay the highest bidder NZ$1,000 “per cigarette that I smoke at any
time following the auction’s closure.”132 We have described the ex ante auction as
selling to the highest bidder the right to be the recipient of any forfeiture
payments. But in another sense, James was indeed selling his “right to smoke.”
Before signing the contract, he had an unfettered right to smoke whenever he
wanted. And smoke he did. He estimates that he had smoked 50,000 cigarettes
before he entered this contract.
On March 31, 2008, James signed his commitment contract with Kent
Pearson. Kent had won the auction for a mere NZ$300.133 James has been under
the contract for over a year. His wife had their first baby, Tripp Sander Hurman,
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on July 21, 2009, and, as of this writing, James has been smoke-free ever since.
For those who think that a commitment compensation auction could never work
in practice, one answer is that it already has. 134 And if it can work for a man, why
not for other private parties or even for governments?
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